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ABSTRACT 
Changing Patterns of Juvenile Justice in District One 
Juvenile C ourt, Utah , as Affected by the 1967 
U . S. Supreme Court Decision on Gault 
by 
Ruth V. Mickelson, Master of Science 
Utah State University, 1970 
Major Professor: Nile Meservy 
Department: Sociology 
A determination was made of the degree to which the fou r require-
ments of Gault were met in District I of the Utah Juvenile Court between 
July l , 1967 and June 30, 1969. The requirements handed down in 1967 
by the U. S. Supreme Court were as follows: (a) guarantee to the right 
of notice given to the juvenile himself and to his parents; (b) right to 
counse l , representation by counsel in juvenile delinquency proceedings; 
(c) right to confrontation and cross-examination by prosecuting witness; 
and (d) privilege against self- incrimination in juvenile delinquency 
proceedings. 
Observable procedures indicate that sustained effort is being made 
by District I, Utah, toward affording protection of basic lega l r ight s to 
juvenile court clients and their families . However, the juvenile court 
records, as the source of information for this study, show the four 
vii 
requirements of Gault as being met only in part during the period of time 
specified. It wa s also found that, with only two changes, the Utah Ju-
v en!le Court Act of 1965 would have already been fulfill ing , in Utah, t he 
requirements provided by the subsequent 1967 U. S . Supreme Court de-
c i sion on Gault. These two recommended changes we re, first , a pro-
vis i on requiring that it be recorded whether or not the chiid was notified 
of h i s rights; and second, that a provision be added to record the name 
of the complainant, his presence , and if his testimony was used during 
the proceeding . 
(117 pages) 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The juvenile court , according to Ellett (1940 - 1942) , should be 
guardian not penal in nature. Nothing the child says can incriminate 
him becat:se his welfare i s the object of the court . To socialize the 
child means to extract the who le truth about the circumstances and to 
cooperate with the child in inding the best solution to his problem. The 
juvenile court aims at treating the wayward child in a way that he may 
become a useful citizen in the future. 
The State of Utah Biennial Report o f the Secretary of the Juvenile 
Court and Probation Commis s io n (1940 - 1942) discusses the foundations 
of the juvenile c ourt : 
It is [jllsQJ pred1cated upon a philosophy that crime in its 
larger sense is not of spontaneous origin but is the outgrowth of 
a developmental precess which had its foundation springs in 
childhood and youth . The juvenile court is also buil t upon the 
theory that the individual is the product of his accumulated ex -
periences plus hereditary endowment; in other words, the 
criminal 1s not born but is made . (State of Utah Biennial Report 
of the Secretary of the Juvenile Court and Probation Commission, 
1940 - 1942 , p . ll) 
It is the purpose of the c ourt only to step into a case when other 
fo rces have failed to result in success. When the court does step in , it 
does not replace other agencies . Instead, it views the child's relati.on-
s h1p to society and then tries to redirect the forces necessary to correct 
any anti-social behavior of the child . 
The Committee on the Standard Juvenile Court Act of the National 
Council on Cnme and Delinquency in Cooperation with the National 
Council of Juvenile Court Judges and the U . S . Children's Bureau 
(19 59, p . 9) stated "the well-e stablished fundamental purpose of the 
c ourts dealing with chi.ldren is to protect them and re store the m to society 
as law-abiding citizens. 
In 196 7, the U . S . Supreme Court handed down what is known as 
the Gault decision designed to further establish the welfare of the ju-
venile . It is the purpose of this study to determine to what degree the 
requirements of this Supreme Court decision are being met in District I , 
Utah . Dist.rict I includes Cache, Box Elder, and Weber counties. 
In 1965, the State of Utah passed a juvenile court law. It is also 
the purpose of this study to determine if this Utah Act established 
guarantees to juveniles which fulfilled, with only two changes , thos e 
guarantees provided in the 1967 Supreme Court Decision . These two 
changes will be discussed at s cme length later in this thesis . 
Definition of Terms 
Some lega l terms and phrases are used in the text of this study . 
To provide a better understanding of the text, t hese words and phrases 
will now be defined . 
Adi udicatory hearing 
The second of three stages of a juvenile court hearing . (The first 
stage is a jurisdictional stage to determine if a petition should be filed . 
The third is the sentencing process or dispositional stage.) The ad-
judicatory stage 
constitutes the determination of whether the petition 
or other formal procedure authorized at the conclusion of the first 
stage is supported by facts and whether those facts correspond 
to the jurisdictional ground asserted in the pleading. (George, 
l968b ' p . 42) 
Advocate 
One that defends and pleads the cause of another . 
According to Lou (192 7) , chancery is welfare or balancing of in -
t.eres t s . The court of chancery assumes the duties which parents are 
unable or unwilling to _ulfi ll . 
"Holding a child, usually prior to trial, in close physical custody 
in a special juvenile detention center" (Cavan, 1962, p . 238) . 
Webster defines the law of equity as : 
The system of law which originated in the extraordinary 
justice fo rmerly administered by the king' s chancellor and was 
later developed into a body of rul es supplementary to or aiding 
the common a nd statute law . The term has come to designate 
the form al system of lega l and procedural rules and doctrines 
a c c ording to which jus ti ce is administered within certain limits 
of jurisdiction . (W e bster, 1963, p . 28 1) 
Esteem 
"The evaluation of an individual's role behavior in a given status; 
the judgment of his fellows of how well he fulfills the expectatlons of 
his role (Sociology 5, no date, p . 3). 
Ex-officio commission 
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A commission created by virtue of an office already held by me mbers 
of t he commission, 
Habeas cor~ 
A writ for inquiring into the lawful ness of the restraint of a 
person who is imprisoned or detained in another's custody" (Webster, 
1963, p. 373) . 
. Incorporated municipality 
Webster (1963 , p . 557) states that a municipality is a "town , city, 
or other district having powers of local self- government." Incorporated 
is defined by Webster (1963 , p . 423) as "united in one body." 
Judicial district 
A certain area held accountable for administrative responsibility . 
Juvenile delinquency 
Cavan {1962, p . 15) gives a nonlegal definition of juvenile 
delinquency : " . .. the failure of children and youth to meet certain 
obligations expected of them by the society in which they live ." 
Good (1945, p . 23) also gives a nonlegal definition : . . any child or 
youth whose conduct. deviates sufficiently from normal social usage to 
warrant his being considered a menace to himself, to hi s future interests, 
or to society itself." Nonlegal definitions vary from authority to a u-
thority , For the purpose of this study, the legal definition used by the 
United States Children ' s Bureau will apply here . Cavan, in her book , 
quotes from the Bneau as follows: 
Juvenile delinquency cases are those referred to courts for 
acts defined in the statutes of the State as the violation of law 
o r municipal ordinance by children or youth of juvenile court age 
or for conduct so seriously anti social as to in t erfere with the 
rights of others or to menace the welfare of the delinquency him-
self or of the community. (Cavan, 1962, p . 15) 
Parens patriae 
The crown or king of a country assuming the role of a father or 
guardian (Lou, 1927) . 
Partisans 
Followers . 
" Supervision of a delinquent child after the court hearing but with -
out commitment to a training school" (Cavan, 1962, p . 238). 
Sovereign 
Highest in power or position. 
A definition of status, which is used in Interm edi ate Sociology , 
Sociology 170, at Utah State University, is as follows : 
. . . the relative position, rank, or standing of a person in 
the group . []tatui} designates a position in the general institu-
tional system, recognized and su ppo rted by the entire society, 
spontaneously evolved rather than deliberately created and rooted 
m the folkways and mores . (Sociology 170, no d ate , p. 20) 
Defining the Schedule 
Questions one through five on the schedule are self-explanatory 
and will not be dealt with in this chapter (see Appendix for schedule). 
Item 6 . Parent-child or parent substitute-child relationship a t the 
time of comm itment . Responses s hown he re were "inadequate" or 
11 adequat e . " 
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Parent- child or parent substitute- child relationship wa s felt, by this 
writer , to be "adequate" on the following basis: (a) consistent, reason-
able discipline adm!nistered by parents and understood by juvenile; 
(b) understanding , on the part of the parents, o f the juvenile's problems ; 
(c) acceptance of the juvenile by his parents; (d) des ire by the parents to 
help the child during thi s period; (e) e qual attention given by parents to 
juvenile and other siblings; and (f) acceptance by the juvenile of limits 
set by his parents . If the writer felt , after reading the social histo ry 
o f the child, that these guidelines were being met in th e home, then an 
"adequate" relationship was recorded . If most of these requirements 
were missing , then an " inadequate" relationship was recorded . In 
many instances, the probation officer used the word "adequa te " or 
'· madequate" in de s cribing the parent-child relationship . 
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Item 7 . Physical l ~vl ng condit ions at the time of comm itment were 
also de flned as "adequa e " and " inadequate ." "Adequate" li '.Ting con-
ditions were included if the following were present: (a) adequate sleep-
ing and living quarters for the number o f family members , (b) cleanliness 
of the ho use and yard, (c) o ther adequate facilities s uch as furniture . 
" Inadequate" refers to physical living conditions which do not meet these 
criteria , 
Items 8 through 25 were answered directly from the fact sheet in the 
social hi story or from papers contained in the legal record . 
Origin and Nature of Problem 
Relevant literature appears to indicate that the guarantees of the 
due process of law, prior tc the U. S . Supreme Court decision on Gault 
in 19 6 7 , were denied to Juveniles in many instances . 
In this study, the case in question is that of Gerald Francis Gault, 
age 15 . George (l9 68b) describes the case : Gerald and a friend were 
picked up by po lice in Arizona after a complai.nt wa s made on them by a 
neighboring lady . During the process of being convicted, Gerald wa s 
den ied six constitutio nal rights: (a) guarantee to the right of notice 
given to the juvenile himself and to h is parents ; (b) right to counsel, 
representation by counsel in juvenile delinquenc y proceeding s; (c) nght 
to confrontation and cross-exammation by prosecuting witnesses; and 
(d) privilege against self-incrimination in juvenile delinquency proceed-
ings. The Gault case was later taken to the U . S . Supreme Court. The 
Supreme Court ' s decision on Gault resulted in the above four guarantees 
to juveniles. The following two rights were not upheld in the U. S. 
Supreme Court decision : (d) the right to a transcript of the proceedings, 
and (f) the right to appellate review. 
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The landmark U. S. Supreme Court decision on Gault sets down the 
guarantees of ; (a) guarantee to the right to notice given to the juvenile 
himself and to his parents; (b) right to counsel, representation by counsel 
in juvenile delinquency proceedings; (c) right to confrontation and cross-
examination by prosecuting witnesses; and (d) privilege against self-
incrimination in juvenile delinquency proceedings. 
As stated by George (l968b , p . 15) , "the Gault case . . . is the 
first in a series of legal battles in which due process requirements will 
be expanded far beyond what has been thought to be their constitutiona l 
limits. " 
These new requirements must be met in each of the juvenile courts. 
This means a complete revision in most of our courts . However , in 1965 
Utah passed a juvenile court law including provisions for protection of 
legal rights for the juvenile . It is assumed, by this writer, that the 
1965 Utah Juvenile Court law would fulfill, with two changes, there-
quirements listed above as set down in the Gauit decision. The two 
recommended changes are : first , a provision requiring that it be recorded 
whether or not the child was notified of his rights to protect against self-
incnmination, and second , that a provision be added to record the name 
of the complainant, his presence, and if his testimony is used during the 
proceeding . Thus , the 1965 Utah Juvenile Court Law , with the above 
two recommended changes , would already have fulfilled the four require -
ments of Gault; namely , notice , counsel , confrontation , and cross-
examination. If these two changes are justified, then Utah ' s District I 
would seem to have fulfilled the above four requirements. 
One aim of this study is to determine to what degree the four re-
quirements set down by the U. S. Supreme Court decision on Gault are 
being met in District I , Utah , as indicated by the juvenile court records 
of this district. District I is comprised of three Northern Utah counties: 
Cache , Box Elder, and Weber . The period covered in this study is from 
July 1 , 1967, to June 30 , 1969. It will be determined whether or not the 
following requirements were met during this time : (a) guarantee to the 
right of notice given to the juvenile himself and to his parents; (b) right 
to counsel, representation by counsel in juvenile delinquency proceed-
ing s; (c) right to confrontation and cross-examination by prosecuting 
witnesse s; and (d) privilege against self-incrimination in juvenile de-
linquency proceedings. 
A second objective of this study is to see if the 1965 Utah Juvenile 
Court Law will fulfill, with only two changes, the guarantees set down in 
the U. S . Supreme Court decision on Gault. These two recommended 
changes are : first , a provision requiring that it be recorded whether or 
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not the juvenile was not ified of his rights to protect him against self-
incr imination , and second , that a provision be added to re co rd t he name 
of the compla inant and if he is pre sent and his testimony used during the 
juvenile court proc e e ding . 
A third aim of this study is to learn about the factors of age, race, 
a nd s ex o the juveniles invol ved in this sample . It i s hoped that this 
info rmation will provide the writer with knowledge relevant to charac-
teristics of juveniles committed to a state industrial institution . 
A fourth aim is to become familiar with the family background of the 
juv enile by looking at his living arrangement at the time of commitment, 
t he parent-c hild or parent substitute-child relationship at the time of 
commitment, the phys ica l livi ng conditions of the juvenile, parent em-
ployment , numbe r of s iblings, and natural parents' marital status at the 
tim e of commitme nt. 
The info rmation re garding the third and fourth aim s of this study will 
be inc luded in the Appen dix ins te ad of the text. The writer feels this in-
fo rmation is not nece s sar ily relevant to the Gault decision, but could be 
use ful for othe r juvenile court s tudies . 
Method and Procedure 
Permission was obtained from Mr. Joseph Tite, Director of Probation 
in District I, Utah, t o us e the juvenile court records from Cache, Box 
Elder, and Weber counties . Fifty-nine cases were used from these three 
counties . This is the tota l number of cases resulting in commitment to a 
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state juvenile institution during the period of July l , 1967, to June 30, 
1969 . Commitments were made only to the Utah State Industrial School 
at Ogden, Utah , and the Youth Unit of the State Hospital at Provo , Utah . 
A pre-test was adm inistered in the Logan City court to see if the 
sch e dule was adequate and if adequate information was available from 
the records . After this pre-test, changes were made to gain the necessary 
information, and the schedu le was then administered to the enti re district. 
After tallying the responses to each question , a separate table was 
arrang ed to score, on a percentage basis, the responses to each question. 
Through this percentage system, it will be determined to what degree the 
four objectives , stated above , were met. 
Within the context of this thesis , the basic study , as described 
unde r this heading of Method and Procedure , is prefaced in some detail 
by Juvenile Court and Gault Case historical background material to offer 
the greatest possible clarification and strength to the study . 
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CHAPTER II 
HISTORY OF THE JUVENILE COURT 
Origin in the United States 
Comments on the historical background of the juvenile court move -
ment in the United States are necessary for a better understanding of the 
philosophies and principles behind the court system as it stands today. 
The juvenile court is of recent origin, particularly in the United 
States . However, many authors, including Lou (192 7), Robison (19 63), 
Grunhut (1956), Mack (1925), Hurley (1925), Cavan (1962), and 
Cadbury (1938) , have traced th e legal principles underlying the movement 
from fa r back into legal history. 
From the work of the above authors, two main schools of thought 
have evol ved concerning the origin of the juvenile court movement: 
first , the idea of chancery o r equity , and second the English Common 
Law theory. A distinction between these two ideas is made below. 
Chancery 
Robinson (1932c) reported that the sovereign during the old courts 
of equity was the ultimate parent of all minors who required care and 
protection . The crown was parens patriae or final parent authority. Its 
power was exercised through the chancellor. 
' 
The court of chancery assumes duties which parents are unable or 
unwilling to fulfill. Lou s tates : 
The essential idea of chancery is welfare or balancing of 
interests . It stands for flexibility, guardianship, and pro-
tection rather than rigidity and punishment. The common-law 
doctrine that the crown is pare_ns patriae, father of his country, 
is but the medieva l way of expressing what we mean today 
when we say that the state is the guardian of social interests . 
{Lou, 1927, p . 4) 
The principle of individual prevention is important to chancery . It 
is the respcnsibility of the state to see that the child's treatment pre-
vents him from further wrong-doing . However, according to Grunhut, 
.. . in the juvenile court this preventive purpose implies more 
than the mere negative aim of making him avoid further criminal 
activities. Rather are its efforts directed to the positive end 
of giving the young delinquent a better start in life . . . . 
{Grunhut , 1955, p . l-2) 
These aims cannot be achiev ed only through legal precepts ; they require 
discretion on the part of the administrator . 
According to Robison, the arguments, that the juvenile court is 
primarily of chancery origin , are as follows: 
1 . The juvenile court embodies the concept of welfare or 
balancing of interests . •. . 
2. Along with English common law, chancery jurisdiction 
and procedure were transplanted to America. In the English com-
mon law, the Crown is the parens patriae, the father of the 
country. In its modern equivalent, the state is the guardian of 
the social interests of the child and thus the ultimate parent. 
Sovereign states have assumed prerogatives and obligations of 
the Crown and still continue to enlarge their summary jurisdic-
tion for the protection and care of the individuals abnormal in 
person . ... Following this line of reasoning , the juvenile court 
laws in the United States may be regarded as a logical extension 
of the principles of chancery in guardianship in the English court 
of neglected and destitute children to cover delinquent behavior 
as well. (Robison, 1953, p . 232) 
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Other writers on the juvenile court accept the chancery origin of the 
court only as it applies to the neglected, d ependent, or destitute child . 
They prefer to trace the application of the juvenile court's jurisdiction 
o ver delinquency to criminal law rather than to an e xtension of the prin-
ciple of chancery . 
English c o mmon law 
Robison (1 963, p. 232) reported that those , who agree with the 
common law principle of criminal responsibility, are referring to the 
English common law which state s that " ... no person can be guilty of 
a crime unless he acted with a guilty mind. A child unde r the age of 7 
is considered incapable of felonious intent . 
Cavan in regards to English common law points ou t : 
. . . children could be held respons ible if it could be shown that 
they were sufficiently intelligent to understand the nature and con-
sequences of their misdeeds and if they could di stinguish between 
right and wrong . Such children could be subjecte d to the same 
c riminal type of tria l and punishment a s adult c rimina l s , even to 
infliction o f the death penalty in extrem e cases . (Cavan, 1962 , 
p . 234) 
This law, which was in Section 7915 of the Compiled Laws of Utah 
in 1917, held that no child between the ages of 7 and 14 should be con -
victed of a crime w ithout clear proof that he knew the wrongfulness of the 
act at the time he committed the crim e . 
Lou (1927) indicated that a new way of dealing with delinquent 
children wa s needed to replace the o ld chancery court's j urisdiction over 
dependent children . This, he felt , was the reasoning beh ind the departure 
fro m the courts of chanc ery , 
As Robison stated: 
Lou concludes that the juvenile c ourt procedure has traces 
of both chancery and criminal law origin and that its logical 
justification is the recognition that the older criminal courts did 
no t succeed in preventing crime, In contrast, the juvenile court, 
c oncerned with ca re and rehabilitation, attempts to replace the 
punitive and retributive attitude prevailing in courts of mo re 
ge nera l jurisdictio n , (Ro bison , 1963 , p , 232) 
Flex ner and Oppenheime r (1922) concluded that regardless of the 
c onflicting view s h e ld by writers as to the origin , the princ iples under-
15 
lying the movement were not new but were applied from the earlier courts 
of chancery , therefore , being a n outgrowth rather than a departure from 
legal theory, 
Cav an (1962) stre ssed that the two forces , chancery and English 
common law , were merged , From this merger came the concept that 
c hildren under a certain age are not responsible for criminal acts and that 
s ome c hildre n are in the need of p rotection by the courts , 
Illinois I uvenile Court Law 
The fi rs t juv enile court did not formally develop until 18 99. How-
ever , attempts were made, before this time, to remove children from 
cri minal courts and to s often " the harshness of the laws" (Lou, 1927, 
p 0 134). 
The Illinois J t:venile Court Law was originated because of this deep 
concern o ver children for who m no appropriate institutional care was 
available , This law wa s no t new in and of itself. Lou (1927) ·reported 
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tha t the only new concept was that the child, who broke the law, was not 
to be regarded as a criminal, The law was passed to regulate the treat-
ment and control of children . 
Provisions of the Illinois Juvenile Court Law, according to Cadbury, 
were as follows : 
1. For the separate hearing of children's cases in a court 
having chancery rather than criminal jurisdiction. 
2 . For the detention of children apart from adult offenders. 
3 . For a probation system. (Cadbury, 1938, p. 72) 
Other beneficial results of the Illinois Juvenile Court Law are 
pointed out by Bloch and Flynn who state, 
.. . that the act eliminated arrests of children by warrants, the 
use of indictment, and virtually all other features of criminal pro-
ceedings, and it provided a separate juvenile courtroom, separate 
records , and informal procedures . (Bloch and Flynn , 19 56, p. 311) 
The aim of the state , according to Hurley (192 S, p . 320), " is 
primarily to adjust the differences existing between its citizens and to 
provide for the wants and nece s si ties of its dependents . " Before the 
Illinois Juvenile Court Law was passed, the state appeared to be neglect-
ing its duty. 
Summary 
Two main schools of thought exist on the origin and development of 
principles behind the juvenile court movement in the United States. 
First is the idea of chancery . Chancery "stands for flexibility, 
guardianship , and protection rather than rigidity and punishment" (Lou, 
1927 , p. 4). 
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The second is the English common law system which stated that no 
chlld unde r sev en was capable of committing a crime . If a child was con-
s 1dered capable of committing a c r ime, then he was t o be tri e d t:nder the 
crimin a 1 law . 
The Illinois Juvenile Court Law wa s originated because of concern 
for the care of children . Its foundations evolved from a combination of 
principles basic to both the law of chancery and the English common law . 
History of the Utah Juvenile Court 
The spread of the j uvenile court movement has been tremendous and 
extended into mo st parts of the world. Every year new laws have been 
passed giving more freedom and power to the juvenile courts . There were 
no traditions in the adm inistrational end of the movement; therefore, new 
pro cedures had to be developed . Through experience and testing , stand -
ard techniques have been formulated . The juvenile court movement, ac -
c ording to Ro bin sen (1936-1938), spread rapidly because it was protecting 
severe penalties against the child . The new law would be a protection 
fe r the child . 
During this time, Lou (1927) tells that many other state s passed 
similar laws, thus making the pioneering state of development for the ju-
venile court la s ting until about 1904 . 
According to Hurley , some of these states were as follows : 
Wisconsin Juvenile Court, March 26 , 1901; Buffalo Juvenile Court , 
May l, 1901 ; New York Juvenile Court, January 1 , 1902; 
Maryland Juvenile Court , june 1 , 1902; Ohio juvenile Court, 
April 18, 1902; Ind iana Juvenile Court, 1903; and Denver ju-
venile Court, 1903. (Hurley , 1925, p . 329) 
This was still a time when the courts were in experimental stages 
and administration had many weak points. Many methods were tried 
and each one was an improvement upon the other. 
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Utah was also involved in the pioneering stage of the development 
of the United States juvenile court system. A detailed discussion of 
Utah's juvenile court history will show the movement toward progressive 
legislation and an up-to-date system. 
Early legislation 
According to Ziegler (1969, p. 1), Utah was developing methods of 
treatment for juveniles even before the Illinois juvenile Court Law of 
1899. ln 18 52, a law was enacted by Utah legislature " ... whereby a 
child could be removed from his home with or without his parent's con-
sent and bound out to other persons." A territorial reform school was 
established in 1888 . "In 1894 children, who were beyond parental con -
trol because of 'incorrigibility' or 'vicious conduct,' were made subject 
to the district court ' s jurisdiction for possible commitment to the ter -
ritorial reform school . " And in 1898, negl ected and vagrant children 
could be placed in a "paternal school" by the court . 
Application of the juvenile court movement in Utah, as reviewed by 
Robinson (l932a), dates back to 1905 when the l egis l ature enacted a law 
permitting l arger cities to establish juvenile courts as a branch of the 
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city court system . A city JUvenile court commission was set up to 
o rganize these courts . The comm i ssi on consisted of the mayor , school 
superintendent , and chief o f po lice . 
The 1905 Act , approv ed Marc h 16 , 1905 , is de scribed by Ro b inson 
as fo llows : 
An act providing for Juve n 'le Courts , provid ing fo r the ap-
pointment of probatio n officers, o utlining their duties and spec-
ifying their compensation; providing a method of proced ure 
against juvenile delinquents, specifying places for then tem -
po rary and permanent detention , and the compensation for their 
care ; providing for the time and place of trial ; defining de-
linquent child and delinquent person; providing punishment for 
all delinquents . (Robinson, 1932a , p . 6) 
In 1907 , the Juvenile Court Commission, which then consisted of 
the governor, the state superintendent o f publi.c instruction , and the at-
torney general, had the powers to establish juvenile courts in larger 
cities o f the state, according to Ellett (1940-1942). This was done at 
the state ' s expense . Before this time , the expense was paid by the city 
administration, and the c ourt ' s jurisdiction was limited to the cit1es in 
which they had been originated , The 1907 legislature , according to 
Winters (1964-1965), also set up a Juvenile Court and Probation Com -
mission on a statewide basis . This commission l asted until 1941. 
Utah Juvenile Court Commi.ssion 
Ellett (1940-1942) reported that a separate juvenile court in each 
judicial district was set up in 1909 and was completely different from the 
district courts. From the Minutes of the Meetings of the Juvenile Court 
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Commission (1909) it can be found that in 1909 a detention home for girls 
was also established . 
In 1910, at the meeting of the Juvenile Court Commission, a dis-
cussion too place regarding the lack of uniformity of the list of offenses 
for bringing in a delinquent child. Because of this irregularity , they de-
cided to lis t offenses under three main headings : (a) offenses against 
s ociety, (b) offenses against the person, and (c) offenses against 
propeny . This wa s done to help save the child from being "tagged" or 
"branded" a criminal for his acts . 
The year 1913, according to Ellett (1940-1942) , saw the juvenile 
courts of each of the 10 JUdicial districts being staffed by one judge and 
a chief probation officer with powers to appoint additiona l probation of-
ficers . This system continued until 1931 . 
" The establishment of juvenile courts in Utah is authorized under 
Section 1814, Chapter 9 of the Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917" (National 
Pro bation and Parole Ass ociatio n, 1929, p . 6). 
At the meeting of the Juvenile Coun Commission (December 18 , 
1926). Section 1814 of the Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917, was d is -
cussed in reference t o the use of jails and prisons for detention rooms 
for juveniles : 
In any and every incorporated municipality , children under 
the age of sixteen ye ars , who are brought before any court of 
summary jurisdiction for examination, under any of the provisions 
of this chapter, shall not befo re trial or examination be confined 
i n the jails , lock-ups, or police cells used for ordinary criminals 
or persons charged wi th crime , nor , save as hereinafter mentioned, 
shall children be tried or have their cases disposed of in the 
police court ordinarily used as such. It shall be the duty of 
such municipalities to make separate provisions for the custody 
and detention of each child prior to their trial or detention ex-
amination, whether by arrangement with some member of the 
police force or other person or society who may be willing to 
undertake the responsibility o f such temporary custody or de -
tention on such terms as may be agreed upon, or by providing 
suitable premises entirely distinct and separate from the ordi-
nary jails , lock-ups or police cel ls , and it shall be the duty of 
the court to try all such children or examine into their cases 
and dispose of them where practicable, in premises other than 
the ordinary police court premises, or, where this is not prac -
ticable, in a private office of the court, if practicable, then in 
the ordinary police court room, but on ly in such last mentioned 
case when an interval of two hours shall have e l apsed after the 
criminal trials or other examinations for the day have been dis -
posed of . . . (Minutes of the Meetings of the Juvenile Court 
Commiss ion, 1907-1939, p. 139) 
As can be seen from the above law, it then was the practice to 
protect the juvenile from any association with criminal courts, prisons, 
or the criminals themselves. 
It can be found, according to Ellett (1940-1942), that the Utah Ju-
venile Court Commission in 1928 initiated a survey of its courts because 
of the lack of improvement in the system. The commission then o btained 
the services of the National Probation and Parole As soc iation to conduct 
the survey. 
Nationa l Probation and Parole Association 
The purpose of the Utah survey, as given by the Field Secretary, 
Drowne, was : 
... to study the organization and administra t ion of the j uvenile 
court system and the procedure followed by the several courts in 
disposing of the delinquent, dependent, and neglected boys and 
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girls brought before them . In addition to the actual survey work , 
school officials, county attorneys, mayors, city marshals, sher-
iffs, representative businessmen and others in each community 
were interviewed to learn the standing and gen era l reputation of 
the courts . (National Probation and Parole Association , 1929 , 
p . 5) 
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Each district court was investigated by the National Probation and 
Parole As sociation , and recommendations were given to help each partie-
ular court system . The National Probation and Parole Association lists 
the following recommendations given to District I: 
1 . Preliminary investigations should be more thorough ... 
2 . Probation should be used in more cases instead of sus-
pended sentences . . .. 
3. A carefully worked out plan of treatment should be 
formulated in each case, and the probation officers, through talks 
with the child and visits to the home and school, should see that 
satisfactory progress is made, 
4. The judge of this court should take a more active interest 
in supervising the work of two probation officers . 
5 . In disposing of cases , orders for the payment of fines 
and fo r commitment to the detention rooms should be made only 
when necessary .. .. 
6 , The juveni.le court should hear all cases of contributing 
to the delinquency, dependency, or neglect of a juvenile that 
arise within the district. 
7 . The judge of this court should receive a somewhat higher 
salary so that he can afford to spend more of his time in the work . 
(National Probation and Parole Association, 1929, p . 20) 
The National Probation and Parole Association (1929 , p. ll) felt 
that the shortcomings in each court were due to a lack of "knowledge as 
to what constitutes good juvenile court work." 
Winters (1964 -1 965) reported that this survey resulted in a complete 
revi sion of Utah ' s juvenile court laws. It was proposed and presented to 
the legislature in 1931 and was enacted into law at that time. Ellett 
explained : 
This act was an attempt to conform in general with juvenile 
c ourt standards fo rmulated by the United States Children ' s Bureau 
a nd was des ign ed to embody the best results of experience of the 
variou s states with juvenile court administration. (Ellett , 1940 -
1942 , p . 8) 
The a c t o f 193 1, according to Winters (1964-1965), remained with 
amendments until the Utah Juvenile Court Act of 1965 . Robinson e1ab-
orated on the powers o f the 1931 act : 
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... extends the parental protection of the court to the point of 
g iving it exclusive original jurisdiction over delinquent , dependent , 
or negle cted children ; to determine paternity, custody or guardian-
ship , and to grant adoptions . The act applies to all children under 
the age of 18 and fo r the purpose of continuing treatment beyond 
the eighteenth birthday the juvenile court can continue jurisdiction 
over a case until the child reaches the age of 21. (Robinson, 
1932d , p . 3) 
Pur_2.ose of th~uvenile COJ,!rt in 1932 
In a l e tter to the Bo ard of Commissioner s of the Utah State Bar , 
dated March 18 , 19 32, Robinson s poke of the principles behind the es-
tablishment of the j uvenile court. 
Underlying the establishment of ju venile courts in the United 
States is the principle that these agencies are to work for the 
social adjustment and correction of the anti - social child who , 
thro ugh the acts of himself or others, is threatened with becoming 
a menace to society . To accomplish this end, the juvenile courts 
are generally given the widest and most complete discretionary 
power to do almost any and all things which a court might do to -
ward restraint and correction or which a parent might , but all too 
often does not , do to provide such care , guidance, and control 
as will conduce to the child's welfare and the best interests of 
the state . (Robinson , 19 32 b , p. 2) 
Ro binson (l 932c) pointed out that there had been a departure, over 
the past years , from criminal jurisprudence to more concern of social 
causes and effects of crime . The court ' s emphasis on the individual and 
the circumstances that led up to his cnme resulted in making more ef-
fect ive use of the soc ra l sc iences in helping the juvenile . 
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It is stated in the Sta te of Utah Biennial Report of the Secretary of 
the Juvenile Court and Probation Commission (1938-1940 , p . 8) : ;,The 
Utah law [Qf 193I] carries into effect the fundamental conception of a ju -
venile co uri. as a parenta I agency , designated to ass ist and protect the 
delinque n t , dependent and neg lected child. " Again f rom t his report, it 
can be found that , at thi s period of time, Utah wa s the first state to pro-
vide for a "satisfactory system" of reco rd keeping . 
~enile Court Commiss1qn abolished - - 194 1 
The Biennial Report of the Secretary of Juvenile Court and Probation 
Department {1 940 - 194 2) states tha t in 1941 the exi sting Juvenile Court 
Commission was abolished and that its powers were as s igned to the 
Pubhc Welfare Commission by Chapter 67, Laws of Utah , 1941. This 
new c ommission had the power to create bureaus, divi sion s, and depart -
ments unde r it to carry out the duties of the commission. Winters (1964-
1965) reports that this step was taken as an e conomy measure . 
The juvenile court operations were later transferred from the De-
partment of Public Welfare in to a new Bureau of Services for Children , 
according to the State of Utah , Department of Publ ic Welfare , Fourth 
Bre nnial Report {1942 - 1944). 
Midcentury White House Conference on Children 
and Youth 
The Midcentury White House Conference on Children and Youth, 
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calledbyPresidentTruman, December3-7, 1950 , atWashington, D. C. , 
had as its purpose : 
[ TQJ consider how we can develop in children the mental, 
emotional, and spiritual qualities essential to individual hap-
piness and to responsible citizenship and what physical, eco-
nomical, and social conditions are deemed necessary to this 
development. (State of Utah, Department of Public Welfare, 
Seventh Biennial Report, 1948-1950, p . 40) 
And again, from the Seventh Biennial Report (1948-1950), it is 
pointed out that this conference was one of the most significant steps in 
studying the needs of children . Because o f this conference, a committee 
was appointed in Utah to study the following areas of child life : the 
home, the schools, the church , health services, programs of vocational 
guidance and placement, recreation , protective and correctional agencies 
and programs, and social service agencies and programs . The recom-
me ndations o f this committee , concerning improvements in the environ -
ment of the child , were joined with those recommendations of the White 
House Conference. 
Question of separation of powers 
According to Ziegler : 
The administration of the juvenile court by the Public Welfare 
Commission continued fairly unquestioned until the latter part of 
the 1950 ' s when a growing number of persons became increasingly 
concerned about the disregard of the principal of separation of 
powers between the executive and judicial branches of government. 
The constitution of the United States and of the State of Utah es -
tablishes the principal of three separate but equa l departments of 
of government: the legislative , the executive , and the judicial. 
Under the 1941 legislation, the law provided " the public welfare 
commission shall have general control and supervision over ju -
venile courts and probation officers . " It was this supervising 
authority granted to the executive branch of government ~elfare 
Departme@ to control and supervise the judicial branch [}uvenile 
courif that raised great concern about the constitutionality of the 
existing system . (Ziegler , 19 69 , p . 2) 
Because of this controversy, a bill was prepared in 1963 (to be 
discussed later) and was later to become the Utah Juvenile Court Act of 
1965 . 
In 1949, John Farr Larson, then director of the Bureau of Services 
for Children of the State Department of Public Welfare , also raised the 
question of a " violation of the constitutional principle of separation of 
powers," according to W inters (1964-1965, p. 503) . 
However, others did not agree with this point of view, and a con--
troversy continued until 1958 when a campaign was initiated by the 
juv enile court judges for freedom in their profession . Winters (1964-
1965) reported that the 1959 Legislative Counsel studied the juvenile 
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courts in their relationship to the welfare department. At the same time, 
a committee from the Utah State Bar made a simila r study . In May 1962 , 
a report from this committee recommended a discontinuation of welfare 
control . The committee gave no charges of mismanagement to the welfare 
department but said it must look to the future with this recommendation . 
On the 1962 recommendations , Winters reported : 
Other recommendations were for the same "status" for ju-
venile courts as for district courts , for an administrative board, 
probation officers attached to the court itself instead of the wel-
fare department , strengthening of the protection of lega l rights 
of parents and children in juvenile court proceedings , and 
citizens ' committees to advise the courts and aid in their public 
relations. A bill to accomplish these purposes was drafted dur-
ing 1962 and introduced in the 1963 legislature, where it passed 
the house but was defeated in the senate . (Winters , 19 64 - 19 65, 
p. 503) 
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To this strategy instigated by the Bar Association, the welfare de-
partment, according to Winters, responded in two ways : 
1. All juvenile court judges ' terms were due to expire on 
June 30. One welfare commissioner announced that there would 
be no recriminations because of the judges' open advocacy ITo 
the bilTI, but added that "we must have loyalty in the futur~" 
2 . The welfare department announced a re-organization of 
the juvenile courts and an establishment of the office of ad-
ministrative judge . (Winters, 1964-1965, p. 503) 
These two responses were criticized by the Bar Association. 
Winters (1964-1965) stated that in August 1963 the Supreme Court of 
Utah declared that the 1931 statute , which gave the welfare department 
power to remove judges , was unconstitutional. In 19 6 5, the 19 63 bill 
was revised, and a bill was passed in both houses without a dissenting 
vote. 
Tuvenile Court Act of 1965-- Utah 
Winters (1964- 1965) reported that the provisions of the Juvenile 
Court Act of 1965 included selection of judges, status of judges , 
citizens advisory committees , and protection of legal rights . It removed 
the juvenile court from the control and supervision of the Department of 
Public Welfare and modernized the court procedures . 
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Ziegler commented on the scope of the 1965 Act : 
The Juvenile Court Act of 1965 defines its purpose to be the 
securing for each child coming before the Juvenile Court such 
care , g uidance, and control, preferably in hi s own home , as will 
serve hi s welfare and the be s t inte re s ts of the sta te; to preserve 
and strengthen family ties whenever possible; to secure for any 
child, who is removed from hi s home, the care , guidance , and 
discipline required to assist him to develop into a responsible 
citizen , to improve the conditions and home envi ronme nt respon-
sible for his delinquency; and , at the same time , to protect the 
com munity and its individual citizens against juvenile violence 
and juvenile lawbreaking. (Ziegle r , 1969 , p . 2-3) 
Provision was made for selection of judges instead of appointment 
by the welfare commission , according to Winters : 
A five-man ex-officio commission was established to be 
known as the Juvenile Court Commission, consisting of the chief 
justice, the state bar president, and the chairman of the welfare 
commission, or their alternates, plus the state superintendent of 
public instruction and the s tate director of public health . This 
commission will no t appoint, but will nominate at least two can-
didates for each vacancy from which the Governor w ill make the 
appointment. (Winters , 1964-1965 , p. 503) 
A second provision of the Utah Juvenile Court Act of 1965 is con-
cerned with the s t atus of judges . Winters makes two statements on this 
subjec t : (a) Juvenile judges will rank equally in their own and other's 
eyes with the district judges . Esteem wa s jus t as important for the ju-
venile judges as the di strict judges. (b) Juvenile judges will receive 
equal treatment with the district judges on matters of sala ry, retirement, 
physical features, and other benefits . 
A third provision was that citizens advisory committees be set up 
to study Utah courts and make recommendations on court ope rations and 
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delinquency control and make recommendations to the judges and assist 
them in promoting better community relation s . 
The fo urth and most important provision, as relate d to this study , 
JS that of pro tection of legal right s . Winters stated : 
. . . the new Utah act tightens up on . .. safeguards , including 
limit of the length of time a child may be held in detention with-
out a court order, a record of juvenile court hearings , especially 
where deprivatio n of custody is involved and guarantee of the 
right to counsel in juvenile courts and the right to court-appointed 
coun se l for persons unable to employ an attorney . (Winters, 
1964- 1965, p . 503) 
The above quote discussed two of the requirements set down in 
Gault : (a) guarantee to the right of notice given to the juvenile himself 
and to his parents, and (b) right to counsel, representation by counsel 
in juvenile delinquency proceedings. 
Ziegler discussed further the requirements of the 1965 Utah Ju-
venile Court Law : 
... the Juvenile Court Act of 1965 places the fo llowing statutory 
limitations on non-judicial adjustment of a case : The facts must 
be admitted a nd established , and consent must be obtained from 
the parent or custodian and from the child, if the child is of suf-
ficient age and understanding. The statute further provides that 
efforts to affect a non -j udicial adjustment may not extend for a 
period of more than two months without l eave of the judge of the 
court who may extend the period for an additional two months. 
If from the results of the preliminary inquiry, it appears 
that it would be in the interest of the child or of the public for the 
court to intervene in the family, then a petition is filed and the 
parents and child notified to appear before the courts . ... Dur-
ing any phase of the hearing , the child and his parents may be 
represented by counsel. Once the court has determined that this 
child is within its jurisdiction and has moved to the dispositional 
phase of the hearing , the court relies heavily upon a s ocial in-
vestigation prepared by the probation department . The written re-
port of the social investigation, which is presented to the court, 
attempts to identify the causes of the child ' s delinquency or the 
situation, which brings the child before the court as dependent 
or neglected, and provides the court with a recommendation for 
an appropriate way to deal with the problem . (Ziegler, 1969, 
p . 7) 
As can be seen in the above quote , the 196 5 Juvenile Court Act of 
Utah had already provided most of the guarantees to juveniles that the 
subsequent 1967 U . S . Supreme Court decision on Gault provided. In 
the first paragraph is stated, " ... facts must be admitted and es-
tablished ... " This statement suggests, although not stated in the 
exact words, that the third requirement of Gault, (c) right to confronta-
tion and cross-examination by prosecuting witnesses, has already been 
met. For facts to be "established," testimony is needed from more than 
just the juvenile. 
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The first paragraph of the above quote also suggests that the fourth 
req uirement of Gault, (d) privilege against self-incrimination in juvenile 
delinquency proceedings, has been met since the paragraph states that 
the ch1ld must be " . .. of sufficient age and understanding ... " before 
he can admit to the facts in the case . 
The second paragraph quoted by Ziegler fulfills the first requirement 
of Gault, (a) guarantee to the right of notice given to the juvenile him-
self and to his parents . The second requirement of Gault is also met in 
this paragraph, (b) right to counsel, representation by counsel in juvenile 
delinquency proceedings . 
Thus, it can be seen that if one sentence t:ad been added to the 
1965 Act to record whether o r not the juvenile was notified of his rights 
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and one sentence added to require the complainant to be named and to be 
present at the proceeding , the four requirements cf Gault , as stated above, 
would ha ve been completely provided fo r in the 19 65 Juvenile Court Act of 
Utah . However, the 1965 Act , as written , ha s provide d mo st of the 
guarantees to juveniles that the subsequent 1967 Gault decision by the 
U . S . Supreme Court prov ided . 
The 1965 Utah Juvenile Court Act prov ided further guarantees to the 
juvenile . These are discussed by Ziegler as follows : 
In matters where the child may be a threat to the community 
or to himself or where there is a breakdown in the structure of the 
family, the court may place the child on probation or under pro-
tective supervision , transfer custody from the parent to an indi -
v idual or agency , commit the child to the Utah State Industrial 
School or terminate all parental rights . The court has broad 
discretion concerning the disposition of a case and is restricted 
only by the lack of community or court resources and by the 
statutory prohibition that a child cannot be committed to jail or 
prison. 
When a child i s placed o n probatio n or under protective 
supervision , he is usually supervi s ed in his home by a probation 
officer of the court. Probation is a process of helping an indi-
vidual accept and live within the limitations required by society . 
The probation officer atte mpts to develo p the potentials of a child 
through counseling or casework services, arranging psychiatric 
assistance when needed , assisting with school curriculum prob-
lems, etc . (Ziegler, 19 69, p . 7) 
When a juvenile is placed on probation in Utah , a list of con-
ditions is given to him and to his parents (refer to Appendix). These 
c onditions must be obeyed by the juvenile, and th e form listing these 
conditions must be signed by the child, his parents, and the probation 
officer . 
A Petition of Expungement (to erase) may be requested by the 
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juvenile (refer to Appendix) . If the conditions indicated on the petition 
have been met, then the juveni.Je court records of the c hild are c o sed for 
mspection . 
U . S. Supreme Court Decision on Gault 
The basic rights of the juvenile appearing before a court were made 
even more apparent in the 1967 Gault decision handed down by the 
U. s. Supreme Court. Good juvenile courts were already assuring their 
juveniles of the rights set down by Gault. It is the other courts that 
needed to be affected by this U. S . Supreme Court decision . There were 
four main requirements set down by Gault: (a) guarantee to the right of 
notice given to the juvenile himself and to his parents; (b) right to 
counsel , representation by counsel in juvenile delinquency proceedings; 
(c) right to confrontation and cross-examination by prosecuting witnesses; 
and (d) privilege against self-incrimination in juvenile delinquency pro-
ceedings . 
The Gault decision and its effect on Utah will be discussed at 
length in Chapter III . 
Words on the juvenile court movement 
in Utah 
In a speech given at the 1967 Idaho Annual Health Conference, 
John Farr Larson, Judge of the Second District Juvenile Court of Utah , 
spoke on the "Role of the Juvenile Court in Juvenile Delinquency." He 
spoke of the three basic elements in the operation of a juvenile court 
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today : (a) protection of the indiv idual right s, (b) prote ction of the public , 
and (c) the court helping ea c h child reach h is potentia l m his role a s a 
responsible citizen . He felt the third element was the separat ' ng po int 
be tween juvenile and ot he r c ourts . 
Judge Larson (1967) quoted po rtions of an addre s s g iven by former 
U . S . Supreme Court Chief Ju stiCe Earl Warren . Judge Larson fel t these 
to be appropriate concernin g the histo ry of the juv en ile court system in 
Utah . 
As you know , the dual roles of the court have g iven rise 
to vexing problems in defining its function and establishing ap-
propriate limits upon its authority. 
In the early history of the c o urt, the tendency was to regard 
its social welfare and ".2ar12ns patriae " functions as o f primary im-
portance . During the past twenty-five years , ho wever , there has 
been evidence of a mounting c o ncern abo ut the n e ed for the co urt 
to pay greater attention t o s afeguarding the legal rights of the 
child . As is perhaps inevitable under s uch c i rc umstances , ex -
tremist points of view have been espoused by partis ans of the two 
Jffiaii!J opposing co ncept s . In one camp are those who maintain 
that the juvenile court , as a c o urt of law , musts rround the ju-
venile with all the legal pro cesses which would be available to 
him were he tried a s an adul t. The opposing v iew i s that the 
s ocial , emotional, educati o nal , health and economi c ne e d s are 
paramount and the task of the court is to meet these requirements 
without concerning itself with legal niceties . 
Surely, the chi.ld, who is the subject of a delinquency com -
plaint, is entitled to comparable, if not greater, safeguards . And 
indeed the task of the juvenile court judge would be a less com-
plicated one if his responsibility began and ended with fulfi lling 
the "nice quillets of the law . " But the j uvenile court is more than 
an instrument of justice; since its inception , mo re than SO years 
ago, this court has been recognized as an instrument of social 
policy . Hence , the juvenile court judge must give equal attention 
both to the needs of the child and the adequate protect ion of 
society. (Larson , 1967 , p , ll-12) 
Summary- -A highlight of Utah ' s history 
The history of Utah ' s Juv enile Court system shows a picture of 
pro gressive movement at eeping an up- t o-date system . Highlights of 
Ur.ah ' s history are as follows ; 
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Utah ' s early legis lation s tarted even before the world ' s first ju-
venile court was developed in 1899 . Utah was developing methods of 
treatment fo r its j veniles as early as 1852 . In 1905 , a law was passed 
permittin g larger cities t o es tabli sh j uvenile courts a s a branch of the 
city court system . The 1917 legislation made it clear that juveniles 
should be separated from cr iminal s. 
The National Probation and Paro le Association, in 1928 , conducted 
a survey oi Utah ' s juv e nile court system which resulted in a complete re -
•is10n of the system as mstructed in t he legislation of 1831. 
The Juven ile Court Commi s sion , set up in 190 5, was abolished in 
1941 a nd its po wers a ssigned to the Public Welfare Commission. 
In 1950 , President Truman called the Midcentury White House Con-
fe rence on Chil dren and Youth to study the needs of children . A study 
wa s done in Utah at this same time and recommendations made to coincide 
with tho se of the conference . 
A question of the separation of powers between the branches of 
government wa s raised during t he 19 SO's . Friction continued until in 19 63 
the Supreme Court of Utah declared the 1931 statute to be unconstitutional 
and a fo rmal bill passe d to this affect in 1965 . Thi s bill removed the ju-
venile court from the De partment of Public Welfare and also modernized 
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c o urt procedures 0 This 1965 Act provided most of the guarantees to ju-
v eniles that a subsequent U o S " Supreme Court decisio n provided o In 
196 7, the basic right s of juveniles were denied a 15- year-old boy o As a 
re s ult , new legi slation wa s handed down by the Supreme Court. This was 
the 1967 U o S o Supreme Court Decision on Gault. This latest legislation 
will be discussed at length in the following chapter o 
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CHAPTER III 
GA ULT AND DUE PROCESS STANDARDS 
In Re Gault , 387 u . s . ~.§22_ 
In 196 7 , the U . S . Supreme Court handed down a decision affect-
ing the procedures in juven: le c ourts . Thi s decision resu lted from a 
denial of guarantees prov ided by the due process of law to a 15-year-old 
boy in Arizona . The guarantees, which became re-established in the 
framework. of juvenile court procedures, were: (a) guarantee to the right 
of not1c e given to the juven ile himself and to his parents; (b) right to 
c ounsel , repre s entation by c ounsel m juvenile delinquency proceedings; 
(c ) right to c onfrontation and cross - examination by prosecuting witnesses; 
and (d) privile ge against s elf-incrimination in juvenile delinquency pro -
ceedings . 
George (1 968 b) gi ves an excellent review of the Gault incident re-
sulting i n co mmitment of a juvenile . On June 8, 1964 , Gerald Francis 
Gault and a friend , Rona l d Lewis, were picked up by the sheriff of Gila 
County , Ari zona , after a complaint was made by Mrs . Cook , a neighbor-
hood lady . 
The complamt was that Gerald and his friend had made obscene 
remark s t o her over the telephone. Gerald was , at this time , on six 
month ' s probatio n following an mcident in February 19 64 . 
Although Gera ld 's parents were at work when h e was picked up, 
no effort was made to no tify them about Gerald . Mrs . Gault returned 
home fro m work at 6:00 P . M . and later lea rned of Gerald's whereabouts 
from the mother c Ronal d Lewi s. The two mothers immediately went to 
the detention home and were told a hearing wo ul d be held at 
three o 'clock , June 9 . 
No transcript was kept of this hearing . Those present were : 
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Gerald, his mother , his older bro ther , and probation officers . Gerald's 
father was out of town wo r ing . No summons or other form of notification 
was sent to him . 
A petition for this hearing wa s filed the day of the hearing, June 9, 
but no co py was g iven t o Ge ra ld 's parents . The petition informing her of 
Gerald ' s c harges was no t seen by Mrs . Gault until August 17 . The com -
plainant was not required to be pre sent; no record wa s made of the pro-
ceedmgs, and mfo rmatlon on the heann g could only be obtained from a 
habeas c orpus bro ught after the hear ngs were over. 
Whe!1 Gerald was relea s ed from custody , June 12 , only a note in-
formmg her of a habeas corpus hearing to begin June 15 of the fo llowing 
week was signed by pro bation officer Flagg and left for Mr s . Gault. 
Mrs . Gault asked that the c ompla i nant be present at th is hearing . 
Judge McGhee denied thi s request testifying that Gerald admitted to 
rna ing some "l e s s obscene remarks . " There was no other evidence 
about Gerald ' s testimony given . A referra l report was never shown to 
Gerald or his parents . At bo th the June 9th and June 15th hearings , 
neither parent rece ived a copy of the petit ion or written notice of the 
hearing. They also were not informed of their right to subpoena and 
c ross-examine the witness. Their right to confrontation and right to 
counsel was denied. No attempt was made to look into the history of 
Gerald's past behavior. No records exist of the delinquency charge 
putting him on probation before this time. Only a referral report of this 
matter was made by the Probation Department. 
At the conclusion of the June 1 Sth hearing, Judge McGhee had 
Gerald committed to the state industrial training school "for the period 
of his minority, unless sooner discharged by due process of law." He 
was only 15 at the time, which could have meant a possible six-year 
committment. 
Judge McGhee based his findings on Gerald ' s being delinquent on 
his past probation charge of stealing a baseball glove 'and also on the 
boy ' s statements of admissions to making lewd phone calls. The charge 
in the final report read, "habitually involved in immoral matters . " 
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According to Clark (1968) , on August 3, 1964, a petition for habeas 
corpus was filed in the Arizona Supreme Court. This, in tum, ordered a 
hearing by the Superior Court of Maricopa County, which was held 
August 17, 1964. At this hearing, there was conflict concerning testi-
mony given at the two earlier Gault hearings. Judge McGhee gave 
testimony such that it was vague as to what law Gerald had violated . He 
spoke on disturbing the peace , using lewd language, and "habitually be-
ing involved in immoral matters." Because no record was available on 
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the proceedings, facts had to be gathered from the testimonies of 
Mrs . Gault , Jud ge McGhee , and Mr. Flagg . Gerald di.d not testify at 
this hearing . 
The Superior Co urt dism1ssed the peti. tion and returned Gerald to 
the Arizona Industrial Schoo l . An appeal wa s then made to the Supreme 
Court of Arizona whlCh a l s o made a denial of the habeas corpus and up-
held the action taken by the juv enile court . 
Clark pointed out that "the Supreme Court of Arizona classified the 
assignments of error under three main headings :" 
1 . That the Arizona Juvenile Code was unconstitutional for 
failure to give notice to parents and children of specific charges, 
for failure to req ui re time ly , adequate and proper notice of the 
hearing , and fo r failure to provide for an appeal; 
2 . That the JUVenile court in fact denied G erald Gault and 
his parents due process of law by failing to provide proper notice 
of both t he deli nquency c harge and the hearing , for failure to 
notify them o f t he ir constitu tional rights to counsel and to remain 
silent , and by relying upon unsworn hea rsay testimony , by failing 
to provide a proper record o f the delinquency proceedings , and by 
rem oving Gerald from the custody of h is parents without any show-
ing of their incompetency or inability to care for h im; 
3 . A gro up o f mis cellaneous errors dealing with the habeas 
corpus hearing in Maricopa County and the original detention of 
Gerald . (Clark , 19 68, p . 14) 
The petition wa s rejected by the Supreme Court o f Arizona on the 
premise that juvenile co urt sta tutes and code s are constitutional. Sev-
eral cases as reference to this point were c ited . The court next used 
the parens patri ae (role of father) doctrine which wa s to benefit and pro-
teet the juvenile . 
When the Ga ult ca se went before the U . S. Supreme Court on 
May 15, 196 7 , it wa s claimed by t he counsel for Gault that Gerald had 
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been denied six fundamental constitutional rights. Four of these were 
confirmed : (a) guaran tee to the right of notice given to the juvenile him-
self and to his parents ; (b) right to counsel, representation by counsel 
1n juvenile delinquency proceedings; (c) right to confrontation and cross-
examination by prosecuting witnesses; and (d) privilege against self-
incriminat.ion in juvenile delinquency proceedings. Two claims, (e) the 
right to a trans cript of the proceedings , and (f) the right to appellate 
review, were not confirmed . 
According to Clark , 
The rationale of the Gault decision is that the impact of a 
delinquency proceeding upon the juvenile is analogous to the 
impact of a criminal proceeding upon an adult . This being so, 
the juvenile is entitled to those constitutional safeguards which 
would be given an adult in a criminal proceeding . (Clark , 1968, 
p . 19) 
~uirements of Gault 
When the Gault case was sent before the U . S. Supreme Court, 
May 15, 1967, George states : 
The court first reviewed the history of the juvenile court 
system and its aim of protecting the juvenile against the harsh-
ness and hazards of an adult criminal proceeding ... and noted 
that the statutes consistently had been sustained as cons t itu -
tional on the theory that they were an exercise of the state ' s 
parens ~triae power and that they were viewed as inherently 
civil or equitable proceedings so that the normal procedural 
guarantees of a crimina l trial were inapplicable to them . De -
spite the aim o f the legislation and the early decisions affirming 
its constitutionality, however, the court concluded that "failure 
to observe the fundamental requirements of due process has re-
sulted in instances , which might have been avoided, of unfair-
nes s to individuals and inadequate or inaccurate findings of 
fact and unfortunate presc riptions of re medy . " Due process has 
returned from its extended holiday . (George, l968b, p . 31) 
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Due to this rule, sev era l re qui re ments we re impos ed upon the court 
proceedings . 
Notice of charges 
The firs t constitut iona l requirement is that there be notice of 
charges given to the juvenile himself and to his parents. George (1968b) 
points out that the notice must be in writing and must contain t he specific 
charges on which the proceeding is to be based. The notice must be 
given at t he earliest prac ticable t ime in advance to permit preparation 
(five days in Utah) . 
Banks and Dunbar (1968) s tated that the purpose of a notice is to 
clarify the issues in the case. 
Ketcham (196 7) rai s ed the question of c onfidentiality of the notice 
if it is given as stated in ault. Ketcham suggests that the parents a nd 
child appear for a preliminary nonjudicial c onference . Then the charges 
could be g iven in privacy and a ny questions answered . 
Weinstein and Goodman (196 7) pointed out that the notice would 
give the child and his parents t he opportunity t o decide wh at action they 
wished to take . Also , t hi s notice would help a void the possibility of 
"double jeopardy," by serving as a basi s for charges being heard and 
dismissed. 
George (l968a) doubts whether, in many cases, there is con s ti-
tutionally adequate no tic e . He s tated that in many ir.stances a no t ice 
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i s withheld because it would be detrimental to one ' s health or disrupt 
trea tm e nt. 
Carver and White (1968 , p . 65) po inted out that the Fourteenth 
Admendment requires " . .. that a juvenile in state proceedings , which 
could lead to his commitment , must be given notice sufficient to permit 
preparation of a defense to charges . " 
Carver and White also make it clear that the Supreme Court wanted 
adequate notice given. They quoted from the court decision on Gault : 
Due process of law requires .. . notice which would be 
deemed constitutionally adequate in a civil or criminal proceeding . 
It does not allow a hearing to be held in which a youth's freedom 
and his parent's right to his custody are at stake without giving 
them timely notice , in advance of the hearing, of the specific 
issues that they must meet. (Carver and White, 1968 , p. 66-67) 
Most constitutional rights can be waived , as pointed out by 
George (1968b), but the waive r must be intelligently made . This also 
ho lds true for the requirement of notice. 
George (l968b) includes in his book a copy of the transcript of the 
Supreme Court hearing . On page 30 o f the transcript , three requirements 
to be included in the notice are given : 
1 . It must state what acts are complained of. 
2. It must state what statute or applicable rule of law 
such acts violate . 
3 . It must give some indication of the consequence of a 
finding against the accused . (George, 1968b, transcript p . 30) 
Also taken from the U . S . Supreme Court transcript is a quote from 
a commentator named Antieau, speaking on the subject of notice : 
As of constitutional right ... a child brought before a ju-
venile court is entitled to a clear statement of the nature and 
cause of the proceedings against him so that he can prepare his 
defense. Since many children will be unable to comprehend the 
accusation, this right must, of necessity, belong also to the 
child ' s parents or guardians . (George, 1968b , transcript p. 33) 
Regarding notice of charges, George (1968c) also states that the 
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parents must receive notice so they can assist the juvenile in the matters 
of procedure . 
Right to counse l 
The next question taken up by the Supreme Court was whether or not 
the juvenile is entitled to be represented by counse l. 
The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration 
of Justice (1967) spoke extensively on the role counsel should play in a 
juvenile court proceeding : 
The commission believes that no single action holds more 
potential for achieving procedural justice for the child in the ju-
venile court than provision of counsel. The presence of an inde-
pendent l egal representative of the child, or of his parent, is the 
keystone of the whole structure of guarantees that a minimum 
system of procedural justice requires. The rights to confront one's 
accusers, to cross-examine witnesses, to present evidence and 
testimony of one's own, to be unaffected by prejudicial and un-
reliable evidence , to participate meaningfully in the dispositional 
decision, to make an appea l have substantial meaning for the over-
whelming majority of persons brought before the juvenile court -only 
if they are provided with competent lawyers who can invoke those 
rights effectively . The most informal and well-intentioned of ju-
dicial proceedings are technica l ; few adults without legal training 
can influence or even understand them; certainly children cannot. 
Papers are drawn and charges expressed in legal language. Events 
follow one another in a manner that appears arbitrary and confusing 
to the uninitiated. Decisions , unexplained, appear too official to 
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challenge . But with lawyers come records of proceedings; records 
make poss ible appeals which, even if they do not occur , impart by 
their possibility a healthy atmosphere of accountabil ity . (Presi-
dent's Commission on La w Enforcement and Admini s tration of 
Justice , 1967, p. 68) 
Lockwood (1968 , p . 99), speaking on the role of counsel , points 
out " . .. that in addition to the traditional ro le of representation, the 
lawyer should participate meaningfully in the dispositional decision . In 
other words, the lawyer mus t truly be both advocate and counselor." In 
the role of representative, counse l must understand procedures particular 
to the juvenile court, have some knowledge of child psychology, under-
stand methods of socia l work, and be a ble to interpret technical language 
to both the parent and child . 
As an advoca te, counsel must be concerned with protecting his 
clients' legal and constituticnal right s. If parents and child have con-
flicting views, it may be necessary to have separat e counsel . 
George quotes from the U . S . Supreme Court Transcript : 
We conclude that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment requires that in re spect of proceedings to determine de-
linquency, which may result in commitment to an ins titution in 
which the juvenile's freedo m is curta iled , the child and his parent 
must be notified of the child 's right t o be represented by counsel 
retained by them or, if they are unable to afford counsel, that coun -
sel will be appointed t:o represent the child. (George, l968b, 
transcript p . 34) 
The probation officer, George (l9 68b) no tes, repres ent s the state 
not the juvenile, and the judge is an arbiter and defender . Thus, only an 
attorney can adequately represent the juvenile . 
The Supreme Court, as quoted extensively by Carver and White, 
did not agree with the state of Arizona when it denied the right of coun -
sel to Gerald and his parents , 
Probation officers . .. are also arresting o fficers . They 
init1ate proceedings and file petitions . .. alleging the delin-
quency of the c h 'l d , and they tes tify .. . agains t the child . 
. . . The probation officer cannot act as counsel for the child . 
His role in the adjudicatory heanng . . . is as arresting officer 
and witness aga inst the child , Nor can the judge represent the 
child . There is no material difference in th i s respect between 
adult and juvenile pr oceedings ... . A proceeding , where the 
issue is whether the child will be found to be ·'delinquent·' and 
subjected to the los s o f his liberty for years, is comparable in 
seriousness to a felony prosecution . The juvenile needs the as-
sistance of counsei to cope with the pro blems of law , to make 
skilled inquiry into the facts . to insist upon regularity of the 
proceedings, and to a scertain whether he has a defense and to 
prepare and submit it. The child requires "the guiding hand of 
counsel at every step in the proceeding against him." (Carver 
and Wh1te, 1968 , p . 68) 
Questions raised by l-.etcham (1967) on the subject of counse l are 
as follows : (a) who is to notify the child and his parents of this right; 
(b) how should t hey be g iven this right; (c) when should this right be 
explained, at the t ime of arrest o r later; (d ) by whom and why shou ld 
this right to co uns el be wa i'Jed; (e) what happens if no response is 
given ; and (f) if contradi c tion arises between parent and child, what 
happens? 
Right to confrontation a nd cross-examination 
Gerald Gault ' s c onfe ss10n, a s pointed out by Carver and White 
(1968). wa s ruled by the U. S. Supreme Court to be disregarded because 
45 
it had been obtained in v iola tion of the Fifth Amendment. Also , the right 
to confrontation and cross -examination, which is a part o f due process. 
was denied. 
46 
According to George (1968b) , the U . S. Supreme Court felt the idea 
of confrontation and eros s - examination to be central to the idea of fair 
judicial proceedings . It shows the reliability of the fact-finding process 
in the United States ' court system . George quoted Wigmore as saying : 
For two centuries past , the policy of the Anglo-American 
System of Evidence has been to regard the necessity of testing by 
cross-examination as a vital feature of the law . The belief, that 
no safeguard for testing the value of human statements is com -
parable to that furnished by cross-examination and the conviction 
that no statement (except by special exception) should be used as 
testimony until it has been probed and sublimated by that test, 
has found in ere a sing strength in lengthening experience. . . . [I!} 
is beyond doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for the 
discovery of truth . (George, l968b, p . 44-45) 
The U. S . Supreme Court went on to point out that, where action 
might be take n that would in jure an individual (such as removing his 
freedom), he must have an opportunity to show that the charges are un-
true. 
The U. S. Supreme Court ruled, according to Ketcham, that: 
We now hold that, absent a valid confession , a determina -
tion of delinquency and an order of commitment to a state insti-
tution cannot be sustained in the absence of sworn testimony 
subjected to the opportunity for cross-examination in accordance 
with our law and constitutional requirement . (Ketcham, 1967, 
p. 170 6) 
Self-incrimination 
The Gault decision decrees that the privilege against self-
incrimination applies t o juvenile delinquency mattets. According to 
George, the U . S . Supreme Court rejected the idea that it had no basis 
in juvenile delinquency proceedings and stated the following : 
•' 
It would indeed be surprising if the privilege against self-
incrimination were available to hardened criminals but not to 
children . The l anguage of the Fifth Amendment , applicable to 
the States by the operation of the Fourteenth Amendment, is un-
equivocal and without exception. And the scope of the privl.lege 
is comprehensive . (George , l968b , p . 35) 
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It appears that charges must be proved by means other than question-
ing the juvenile in court . Waiver of this privilege means that a "specific 
warning " must be given in the first place o Failure to speak on the part of 
the juvenile will not be used against him. 
The majority opinion of the U. S . Supreme Court, as stated by 
George, is as follows: 
In fact, evidence is accumulating that confessions by ju-
veniles do not aid in ·' individualized treatment , " . o o and that 
compelling the child to answer questions , without warning or ad-
vice as to his right to remain silent, does not serve this or any 
other good purpose o • o o [I[] seems probable that , where children 
are induced to confess by " paternal" urgings on the part of of-
ficials and the confession is then followed by disciplinary action, 
the child ' s reaction is likely to be hostile and adverse--the chi ld 
may well feel that he has be en led or tricked into confession and 
that despite his confession, he is being punished. (George, 1968b, 
p . 36) 
On the subject of interrogating juveniles, as reported by George, 
the U . S . Supreme Court also concluded : 
We conclude that the constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination is applicable to the case of juveniles as it is with 
respect to adults . We appreciate that special problems may arise 
with respect to waiver of the privilege by or on behalf of children 
and that there may well be some differences in technique--but not 
in principle--depending upon the age of the child and the presence 
and competence of parents . The participation of counsel wi ll , 
of course, assist the police, juvenile courts and appellate tri -
bunals in administering the privilege . If counsel is not present 
for some permissible reason when an admission is obtained , the 
greatest care mu s t be taken to assure that the admission was 
voluntary, in the sense not only that it has not been coerced or 
suggest ed but also that 1t is not t he product of ignorance of 
rights or of adolescent fantasy , right or despa ir . (George , 
l968b, p . 37) 
Implications of Gault and due process 
in the juven ile court 
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George (l968b) po ints out that the Gault decis ion requires jurisdic-
tion of the juvenile court to be broken down in to its component parts . 
There are three basic types of proceedings : delinquency , c hild neglect, 
and child custody proceedings . Gault , as stated earlie r, is limited to 
delinquen cy proceedings which c urtail a juvenile ' s freedom by resulting 
in commitment to an institution . 
In the delinquency proceeding , Gault is chiefly con cerned with the 
adjudicatory stage or the decision making stage . This stage, according 
to George, 
constitutes the determination of whether the petition or other 
form al proced·c:re authorized at the conclusion of the first stage is 
supported by facts and whe t her tho se facts correspond to the 
jurisdictional ground asserted in the pleading. (George, l968b, 
p. 43) 
This adjudicatory stage ia called the second s tage of a delinquency pro-
ceeding . 
George goes on to define the other two stages, although as of this 
date, Gault is not concerned with these. 
The fi.rst stage, or the jurisdictional hearing , . . . i s the 
initial determination of whether a petition shou ld be filed or a 
formal pleading lodged . 
This stage ... becomes in effect the equivalent to the 
preliminary examination m states using the information system 
in adult criminal cases or to the grand jury in the states ad-
hering to the traditional mdictment system . 
The third stage is the dispositional hearing ... which 
may Clppmpoately be conducted if at the conclusion of the 
second stage the juveni le is adjudi.cated to be delinquent. 
The right to c ounsel extends to this third stage, but it is ques-
tionable whether the other Gau lt requirements , and particularly 
the right to confront witnesses, apply as well . Thi s stage is 
the equivalent to the imposition of sentence in an ordinary 
criminal case. (Ge orge , i968b, p . 42-44) 
According to Ketcham (1967) , Justice Fortas delivered the opinion 
of the U. S . Supreme Court on May I 5 , 1967. This opinion covered 
59 pages; the concurring opmions ran 21 pages, and Just1ce Stewart's 
dissent wa s four additional pages . 
From this writing , Ketcham (1967 , p . 1700) has summarized four 
guidelines to be followed in the court : (a) the court should be a legal 
proceeding from which a decision is made from the facts and evidence 
given, (b) accompanying the change to a more legal proceeding will be 
a shift in discipline, (c) "[iJnstead of devoting much time to the pre-
vention of delinquency •.. the juvenile court will be expected to con-
centrate upon adjudication and ordered correction," and (d) narrowing of 
juvenile court jurisdiction will be· a result . 
Ketcham (1967) also points out six immediate effects from the 
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Gault decision : (a) Past theory of parens patriae will be changed. Con-
stitutional protections must now be granted the juvenile as well as an 
adult; (b) reduction o freedom for juvenile court judges who have, in the 
past, been a ~rens patriae or father symbol; (c) no longer will there be 
"civil" juvenile court proceedings. Now formality , regularity, and 
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orderliness will be increased; (d) fatherly discretion concerning pro-
cedure in courts will be changed by having a clear understanding of due 
process requirements; (e) an increase in lawyers will be needed; and 
(f) communities will look at the input-output powers of their courts . 
To help the increased number of cases, the President's Commission 
on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice has suggested , accord-
ing to Ketcham (1967) , that less serious cases be transferred to Youth 
Services Bureaus. To reduce intake, the commission has recommended: 
(2) a reduction of the upper age limit o f juveniles within the court ' s juris-
diction; (b) the wide range of juvenile offenses to be narrowed; (c) trans -
ferring adult cases, such as "contributing," to an adult court; (d) the 
transfer of traffic cases to a traffic court; and (e) transferring abandoned 
and neglected cases to the domestic relations court. 
Pro fessor Ronald Boyce at the Juvenile Rights Conference, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, also listed recommendations to be followed : 
l. Regarding notice, sta tutory pleading forms in the state 
code should be followed . Use facts if no pleading forms are avail-
abl e for the offense . Notice should be served on both child and 
parents, allowing at least five days exclusive of weekends and 
holidays . 
2. Notice should contain advice as to right to counsel and 
parties should be advised again at the hearing. The court s hould 
obtain a specific declination if counsel does not appear. The ju-
venile court should establish a specialized, interested roll of 
attorneys, not a general calling of the bar. 
3. Direct testimony from witnesses is to be preferred. 
Confrontat ion and eros s - exa mination should be allowed. 
4 . No statement from the juvenile should be taken without 
advice and clear waiver. There should be no comment made on 
refusa l to testify. 
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5 . The court should have witne sses present rather than 
wait to see if the child w ill ccnte st the matter . (Boyce , 196 7, 
p . 3-4) 
Garff (1967 , p . 9) , at the s ame Juvenile Rights Conference, listed 
three areas o f change the President ' s Co mmission on Law Enforcement 
and Administration of Justice has recommende d . Acc ording to the report, 
however, " Utah is one of th e better courts i n the country in the terms of 
the criticisms in the Commi ssion Report . " The three recommendations 
listed by Garff are as follows : 
l . Principal rehabilitative efforts should be in the com-
munity before a ssumption of jurisdiction by the juvenile court . 
2 . The court ' s juri s diction should be narrowed to cases 
of manifest danger to c h ild or community . 
3 . Court procedures should be infused w ith safeguards to 
ass ure fai.r and reliable determinations . (Garff , 1967, p . 9) 
Larson (1967 , p . 10-l l) strongly feels that, if the juvenile court is 
to fill its new role, re search must play a greater role. " Research is 
sorely needed regarding the effect of the juvenile court he aring on the 
child . " Al so, research i s needed in the areas of authority, caseload 
size, types of probation officers, treatment needs, and methods in the 
entire correctional field . 
Due Process 
Since the Gault decision came about because due process rights 
were denied Gerald, examination into these rights is warranted . This 
section will , therefore , be devot ed to a discussion of due process and 
the ba sic protections offered therein . 
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Bill of Rights 
The Bill of Right s of 1789 refers to the first ten amendment s to the 
Federal Constitution. According to Neigher (1967}, they were intended to 
serve as limitations on the Congress, the Executive , and the Judiciary 
branches of the Federal Government . Only four of the ten amendments, 
the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth , and Eighth , are related to criminal process. Of 
these four mentioned , only t he nfth and Sixth Amendments were issues in 
the Gault decision. However, the Fourteenth Amendment must also be 
discussed as it relates to the application of the entire ten amendments. 
The mos t pertinent part of the Fourteenth Amendme nt to this study 
is Section l which stares : 
. .. no state shall make or enforce any law whic h s hall abridge 
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law, or deny to any person within its 
j urisdi.ction the equal protection o f the laws . (Commange r, 1968. 
p . 147) (Italics mine.) 
The "due process" clause in the Fifth Amendment was made applic-
a ble to t h e states because of the above Fourteenth Amendment . 
Fifth Amendment 
The provis ion regarding grand jury indictments in the Fifth Amend -
ment has as its purpose : 
. to in s ure that persons will not be brought to tria l arbitrarily 
wh en there i s no reasonable ba sis for believing they are guilty of 
a crime, and that those who are brought to trial will be adequately 
informed of the charges against them . (Neigher , 1967. p. 10) 
I 
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The next clause of the Fifth Amendment as quoted fro m Commanger (1968, 
p. 146) provides " . . . that no person s hall . . . be s ubject for the sa me 
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . " According to 
Commanger (1968 , p. 146) , the next provi sion is that " .. . no person 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witnes s against himself . " 
This l ast provis ion , as pointed out by Neigher (1967 , p . 10) , involves 
two aspects : " (l ) The right to be free from coercion de signed to extra c t 
a confession, and (2) the right to remain silent without having an infer-
ence of guilt drawn from that silence." 
Due process requires that Congress not make laws that are unreason-
able or arbitrary. Also , once laws are made , they must be applied fai r ly. 
Sixth Amendment 
This am endment is of particular importance in the Gault decision. 
It reads as follows : 
In all crimin al prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial , by an impartial jury of the 
Sta te s and District wherein the c rime shall have been committed ; 
which District shall have been previously ascertained by law , 
and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him ; to have compul sory 
process fo r obtaining witnesses in his iavor, and to have the as-
sis tance of Counse l for his defense. (Commanger , 1968, p. 146) 
(Italics mine . ) 
The phrase regarding notice is more relevant t o Gault . Thus, as 
stated previously, the accused must have s ufficient notice to a llow him 
time to prepare a defense . 
The phras e above , which states the ri ght "to be c onfronted with 
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the witnesses against him," also is relevant to the present study . As 
stated by Neigher (1967 , p . ll) , "the philosophy underlying this clause 
is that the accused s hould be met by his accusers face-to-face and be 
able to subject the testimony o f the witnesses agalnst him to cross-
examination . 11 
Also, in the Sixth Amendment is included the power to compell wit-
nesses to appear for testimony. 
And, finally in the Sixth Amendment is included the right to "have 
the assistance for counse l fo r his defense." 
It should be evident to the reader that the legal precedents 
handed down by the Gault decision are neither numerous nor com-
plex. At any proceeding where a child may be committed to a 
state institution , that child and his parent or guardian must be 
given notice in writing of the speci ic charges against the child 
sufficiently in advance of the proceedings to permit adequate 
preparation. The child and hi s parents or guardian must be noti-
fied of the child ' s right to be represented by counsel, and if fi-
nancial considerations so require, counsel must be appointed for 
them . The child and his parents or guardian must be advised of 
the child ' s right to remain silent. Admi ssion or confessions ob-
tained from the c hild withou t the pre s ence of counsel must under-
go the greatest scrutiny in order to in s ure reliability . In the 
absence of a valid confesswn, no finding of "delinquency" and 
no order of commitment of the child for any length of time may be 
upheld unless such finding is supported by confrontation and 
sworn testimony of witnesses available for cross -examina tion . 
(Neigher , 196'7 , p . 16) 
Summary o f Gauit and Due Process Stan dards 
Gera ld Francis Gault wa s picked up by a sheriff in Arizona after a 
complaint was made by a ne ighboring lady. During the course of the ju-
venUe court proceedings , Gerald was depied s ix constitutional guarantees 
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of due process of law: (a) guarantee to the right of notice given to the 
juvenile himself and to hts parents; (b) right to counsel , represent a tion 
by counsel in juvenile delinquency proceedings ; (c) right to confrontation 
and cross-examination. by prosecuting witne sses; (d) privilege aga inst 
self-incrimination in juvenile delinquen cy proceedings; (e) the right to a 
transcript of the proceedings, and (f) the right to appellate review . 
When the case was appealed to the U. S. Supreme Court, the first 
four guarantees were upheld in the Supreme Court decision . The latter 
two were not . Therefore, the 196 7 U . S . Supreme Court decision on 
Gault guaranteed the following requirements to all j uven iles : (a) guarantee 
to the right of notice given to the juvenile himself and to h i s parents ; 
(b) right to counsel , representation by counsel in juvenile delinquency 
proceedings; (c ) right to confrontation and cross - examination by pros -
ecuting witnesses ; and (d) priv ilege against self-incrimination in juvenile 
delinquency proceedings . 
The Gault decision is concerned with the adjudicatory or decision 
making stage of the juvenlle delinquency proceedings. The due process 
guarantees denied to Gerald were contained in the Fifth and Sixth Admend-
ments of the Bill of Right s and a lso in the Fourteenth Amendment which 
made the "due process" clause in the Fifth Amendment applicable to all 
the states . 
The four requirements guaranteed to j uveniles by the 1967 Gault 
decision are to be used in each juvenile court of the United States . The 
primary purpose of this paper is to present evidence co ncerning the de -
gree that the reqmrements o f Gault are being gua ranteed in Di s tri c t I, 
Utah . This evidence is pre s ented in Chapter IV. Furthe r findings and 
discussion on age , sex, race , and family backgro und of juveniles in-
volved in the study can be found in the Appendix. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION ON GAULT 
In the following section, a discussion of the findings concerning 
the proceedings surrounding the juvenile court hearings (inc luded in this 
study) at the time of commitment will be given . These proceedings in-
clude : (a) total number of previous court appearances by the juvenile 
before his commitment, (b) offenses of the juvenile resulting in commit-
ment, (c) parent or parent substitutes present at hearing, and (d) how 
summons were served . This review is essential to the understanding of 
why the juvenile was committed and to the nature of parental support the 
juveniles received at the time of their court hearing . 
A review of the findings of Gault will then follow . This review will 
aid in the determination of the extent to which the requirements of Gault 
were being met during the period designated by this study. The four re-
quirements are as follows : (a) guarantee to the right of notice given to 
the juvenile himself and to his parents; (b) right to counsel, representa -
tion by counsel in juvenile delinquency proceedings, (c) right to con-
frontation and cross-examination by prosecuting witnesses; and 
(d) privilege against self-incrimination in juvenile court proceedings. 
After these findings have been reviewed, a discussion will be offered on 
each requirement of Gault . Some of the data indicated that two of the 
requirements of Gault, (c) right to confrontation and cross-examination 
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by prosecuting witnesse s, and (d) privilege against self-incrimination in 
juvenile court proceedings, are not being fully meL In actuality , these 
requirements were being met during the time of this study, and a discus-
sion will be presented to substantiate this conclusion. 
Findings on Iuvenile Court Proceedings 
Looking at the record of previous court appearances for the juvenile , 
it was found that 37.3 per cent or 22 of the juveniles had appeared in 
court zero to two times previous to being committed to an institution. 
However, 35.6 per cent or 21 juveniles had appeared three to five times 
previously. One-fourth or 2 5 . 4 per cent of the juveniles had appeared in 
excess of six times. Thus , a total of 36 or 61.0 per cent of the juveniles 
had appeared in court in an excess of three times before being committed 
to an institution . These percentages do not, of course, take into con -
sideration the number of warnings a child had received or the number of 
times the juvenile was released without action being ta ken . As is stated 
in Table l, these figures were taken from the child ' s first commitment 
that fell within the period of time of this study . Many juveniles had been 
committed prior to the starting time of the study, and many were re-
committed after their first commitment, the commitment used in this study. 
Table 2 reports the offenses for which juveniles were committed. 
Exactly twice as many juveniles were committed because of behavioral 
problems than for the next most frequent offense, illegal entry. Twelve 
cases or 17. 6 percent were in the illegal entry category as compared to 
Table l . Total number of previous appearances in court before com-
mitmenta 
Number of Number of 
appearances responses Per cent 
0 - 2 22 37.3 
3 - 21 35 . 6 
6 plu s 15 25 . 4 
Not recorded __ l_ 
_LZ 
Total 59 100 . 0 
aAuthor used juvenile ' s first commitment that fell within the period of 
July 1, 1967 -June 30 , 1969. Many juveniles had been committed pre-
vious to this, and many were re - committed . 
Table 2 . Offenses of juveniles resulting in their commitment 
Offense Number Per cent 
Assault 4 . 4 
Automobiles 6 8.8 
Firearms 0 0 . 0 
Illegal entry 12 17.6 
Jeopardy of self 7.4 
Mischief or vandalism 1.5 
Sex offenses 0 . 0 
Theft ll 16.2 
Behavioral problems 24 35.3 
Misdemeanor 2 2.9 
Felony Violations 3 4 . 4 
Other a 1.5 
Not recorded 0 ~ 
Total 6sb 100 . 0 
a Parents would not accept responsibility of child. 
bTotal of first column is greater than the sample of 59 cases because 
some juveniles were charged with more than one offense . 
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24 cases or 35 . 3 per cent in the beha vioral c ategory . The behavioral 
problems involved tho s e j uveni.les who had run away from home . As 
s tated previously, it wa s not this one o ffense alo ne that resulted in a 
juvenile being committed , bu t a c ombination of problems . On the basis 
of these percentages , it would appear that behavioral problems are a 
result of an unfa vorable family situation or home life, an o bservation 
which is prevelant in c urrent literature . Looking at the rest of Table 2, 
three cases or 4 . 4 per c ent we re as s ault, 3 . 8 per cent or six cases 
automobile cases (stated as "depriving the owner of his auto"), 7. 4 per 
cent or five cases of jeopardy o f self, 1. 5 per cent or one case mischief 
or vandalism , and 2 . 9 per c ent o r two cases of mi s demeanors . Theft 
comprised 16 . 2 per cent or 11 cases . This was the third most frequent 
offe nse (refer to Appendix) . 
Of considerable interest to the study is the percentage of parents 
or parent substitute s present at the hearing . Table 3 shows that in the 
larg e st number of ca s e s, 47 . 4 per cent or 28 o f the 59 cas e s , only a 
mother figure was present. However , closely following the cases, 
where only a mother figure was present, was 33 . 9 per cent or 20 ju-
veniles where both parental figures were present at the court hearing. 
In six cases or 10.2 per cent , only a fa ther figure was present . In 
8 . 5 per cent or five o f the cases, neither parent was present . 
Table 4 shows the number of juveniles present at their court hear-
ing . Fifty- seven of the 59 children were present at the hearing fo r a 
total of 9 6 . 6 per cent . Only two or 3 . 4 per cent were not pre sent. 
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Table 3. Parents or parent substitutes present at court hearing 
Person present 
Father or father substitute 
Mother or mother substitute 
Both of the above 
Ne ither of the above 
Not recorded 
Total 
Table 4. Was juvenile present at hearing 
Respor.se 
Yes 
No 
Not recorded 
Total 
Number 
6 
28 
20 
_Q 
59 
Number 
57 
_Q 
59 
Per cent 
10.2 
47.4 
33.9 
8 .5 
_Q_,_Q 
100.0 
Per cent 
96.6 
3.4 
_Q_,_Q 
100.0 
Concerning the manner in which a summons was served, 96.6 per 
cent or 57 summons were delivere d in person in a written statement. 
Mr. Tite (1969) informed this writer that each of the natural parents must 
receive a separate summons. If separated, both parents are located and 
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served . If unknown, the summons must be printed in the newspaper four 
times and a form signed by the probation officer or the one searching for 
the parent stating that he has not bee n able to locate the parent. The 
parent substitute is summ oned if both natural parents are deceased 
(see Table 5) . 
Table 5. How summons were served 
Process 
Written 
Verbal 
Delivered in writing 
Not recorded 
Total 
Summary of procedures surrounding 
juvenile court proceeding 
Number Per cent 
1.7 
0 0.0 
57 96.6 
_l ___l_,__Z_ 
59 100 . 0 
A review of the findings of procedures surrounding the juvenile 
court hearing of children involved in this study was made. The finding s 
are summarized as follows : (a) The largest percentage of juveniles had 
appeared before the juvenile court in excess of three times . One -fourth 
of the total sample had appeared over six times; (b) Twice as many ju -
ven iles were committed to an institution because of "behavioral 
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problems" than for any other offense ; (c) In the largest number of cases , 
only a mother figure was present at the heanng. However, about one-
third of the juveniles had both parental iigures present ; (d) Fifty-seve n 
of the 59 children in this study were present at their court hearing ; and 
(e) In over 95 per cent of the cases, a written summons was delivered in 
person to parents. 
Findings of Gault Requirements 
The date of the juvenile court proceeding for each juvenile was 
broken down into six-month period s. The number of cases in each period 
was very close. However, there were more cases appearing in court 
from July of 1968 th rough December of 1968 than during any other period 
of time in this study (see Table 6). 
Table 6. Date of juvenile court proceeding 
Date Number Per cent 
July 19 67 - December 1967 13 22 . 0 
January 1 9 68 - June 19 68 14 23 . 7 
July 1968 - December 19 68 18 30 .6 
January 1969- June 1969 14 23. 7 
Not recorded _Q __Q.,_Q_ 
Total 59 100 . 0 
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The first requirement of Gault deals with both parents and child 
being not ified of their rights . Mr . Tite (1969) pointed out to this writer 
that the requirement of notifying the child of his rights would no t be 
clearly reflected in the Juvenile Court records. This o bservation appears 
to be true as indicated in Table 7 . 
Table 7 . Were parties advised on legal rights 
Parents advised Child advised 
Response No. % No. % 
Yes 53 89.8 8.5 
No 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 
Not recorded 
_6 ~ .i1 ~ 
Total 59 100 . 0 59 100 . 0 
In 91.5 per cent or 54 of the cases , no record was kept as to whether or 
not the child was notified of his rights. After looking further into th is 
matter, it was found that each court proceeding is tape recorded and the 
tape kept on file. If needed, one could listen to the hearing to see that 
the chi ld was notified of his rights by the judge in each proceeding. 
This author attended a c ourt proceeding in Weber county on 
July 22, 1969. At the beginning, Judge Anderson, present District I 
juvenile court judge , told the juvenile of her rights and asked both the 
parents and the child if they wanted an attorney. This right to counsel 
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was waived . The forms used to record the minutes from each court pro -
ceeding were drawn up from the Utah Juvenile Court Act of 19 65 , and this 
one requirement was not included . However , it is assumed that each 
child is notified by the judge and also usually by the person taking the 
child into custody . As to the parents being advised of their rights, 
Table 7 shows that 89 . 8 per cent or 53 of the 59 parents were advised o f 
their rights, with only 10 . 5 per cent or six of the cases not being re-
corded . 
As stated in Chapter III of "Gault and Due Process," a child and 
his parents are entitled to representation by legal counsel. Counsel 
must be assigned if either a child or his parents request it. If the family 
cannot afford legal counsel , then the court must appoint a representative 
for them . According to Table 8, only 2 5 . 4 per cent or 15 of the cases 
were represented by a lawyer . However, 71. 2 per cent or 42 children 
and their parents waived this right. Only two cases did not have this 
information recorded . Regarding the re sponsibility for legal coun s el 
(whether legal counsel was appointed by the court or expense accepted 
by the family), only one case wa s recorded as having the family accept-
ing the expense. Fourteen cases or 2 3 . 7 per cent of those with legal 
advice did not record the means of appointment of defense counsel. 
A third requirement of Gault , right to confrontat ion and cross-
examination by prosecuting witnesses, is treated in Table 9. It was not 
recorded as to whether or not the complainant was present or his testi-
mony used in 72 . 9 per cent or 43 of the cases , possibly because a 
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Table 8 . Was juvenile or family represented by counsel; if no , did they 
waive their right; if not waived, did court appoint counsel 
Represented by 
counsel Waived right 
Response No. % No. % 
Yes 15 25.4 42 71.2 
No 42 71.2 15 25.4 
Not recorded 
....1 ___l_,_i ....1 ___l_,_i 
Total 59 100 .0 59 100.0 
Table 9. Right to confrontation and cross-examination 
Situation 
Complainant present a t 
hearing 
Complainant not present 
but testimony used 
Complainant not present and 
testimony not used 
Not recorded 
Total 
Number 
16 
0 
0 
59 
Court 
a12120inted 
No. % 
1.7 
44 74.6 
li __1_U 
59 100.0 
Per cent 
2 7. 1 
0 .0 
0.0 
100 .0 
67 
police officer will often file the complaint, and it is not recorded on the 
legal transcript (see Appendix) if the police officer or the complainant is 
pre s ent during the hearing for testimony. Usually, if a citizen files the 
compla int , he will appear, simply because of his intere st involved . Tn 
onl y 27 .l per c ent or 16 of the cases was the complainant recorded as 
being pres ent. However, in none of the cases recorded, was testimony 
us ed without the complainant being present . 
Concerning self-incrimination, a fourth requirement of Gault, 
Tabl e 10 shows that 53 or 89 . 8 per cent of the 59 juveniles admitted that 
charges against them were true. This was kept in writing on each of the 
l eg al forms . Only four of the cases did not have this recorded . Two ju-
veniles or 3 . 4 per cent did not admit to the charges brought against them, 
but the c harges were proven by testimony from complainants . 
Table 10. Child admitted allegations to be true 
Response 
Yes 
No 
No t recorded 
Tot al 
Number 
53 
___i 
59 
Per cent 
89.8 
3 . 4 
_u 
100 . 0 
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Also concerning self-incrimination, Table 11 shows that 44.0 per 
cent or 26 of the charges brought aga inst the juveniles were proven by 
direct testim ony from the juvenile, while only 3 . 4 per cent or two of the 
c harges were proven by means other than question ing the juvenile . How-
ever , 27 . 1 per cent or 16 of the se cases made use o f testimony from both 
the juvenile and the complainant. One-fourth or 25. 5 per cent did not 
record how charges were proven, other than the child admitting to the 
charges as indicate d in Table 10. 
Table 11. Privilege against self-incrimination in proceedings 
Situation Number Per cent 
Charges proved by means other 
than questioning juvenile in 
c ourt 3 . 4 
Charge s proved by direct testi-
ma ny from juvenile 26 44 . 0 
Both of above 16 2 7. 1 
Not recorded 12 __1_U 
Total 59 100.0 
At the conclusion of each hearing, reported in thi s study, each ju -
venile was committed to an institution . A total o f 96 . 6 per cent or 57 of 
the 59 juveniles was committed to the Utah State Industrial School. Two 
of the cases or 3. 4 per cent were committed to Provo Hospital for psy-
chological testing and evaluation (see Table 12). 
Table 12 . Place of commitment 
Institution Number Per cent 
Utah State Industrial School 57 96 . 6 
Provo Hospita l 3 . 4 
Other 0 0.0 
Not recorded 
_Q _Q_,_Q_ 
Total 59 100 . 0 
Summary of findings of Gault requirements 
Findings on each of the four requirements of Gault, (a ) guarantee 
to the right of notice given to the juvenile himself and to hi s parents; 
(b) right to counsel, representation by counsel in juvenile delinquency 
proceedings ; (c) right to confrontation and cross-examination; and 
(d) privilege against self-incrimination in juvenile delinquency pro-
ceedings, were given in Tables 6-12. The findings were as follows: 
(a) Fifty-three of the 59 parents were notified of their rights . Only five 
of the children were recorded as being notified of their rights; in the 
other 54 cases, this information was not recorded; (b) The largest per-
centage of juveniles and their families were not represented by counsel. 
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However, when no t repre sented, a ll the families waived this right. It 
wa s not recorded , in the large;, r number 0 1. cases , who assumed the re -
sponsibility for counsel a}Jpo ntme t , the fa rr. dy or the court; (c) It was 
not recordea, in the large st number o f c a ses, whether or not the com-
pla lnant was pre sent at the JU Venile court prcceeding ; (d) In almost 
90 per cent of the cases, the JU Ve nile adm.'ned t he charges aga inst him 
w be uue ; ana (e) ln the large t number o f cases, i t wa ;, re orded thar 
offense s aga inst the juvenile we re proven through hi s direct testimony . 
Jn 16 of the 59 cases, bo th testimony from the juvenile and the c om· 
plainant we re used . 
Table 6 reviewed the data or each juvenile c o-c rt proceeding . The 
largest number of ca ses fell within the period o f July 1968 through 
December 1968 . Table 12 names the institwtions to which juveniles 
were committed during t he peri·~d cf this study . Fifty- seven o the 
59 juveniles were committed to the Utah Sta ·e Indus:ria l School. The 
o ther two juvenile s were c" mmitted ro Provo Ho spital. 
Discus sion 
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Table I, t otal number of previous appearances in court before 
commitment, indicate s a large number o f JUVe niles had appeared in the 
juvenile court of District I in a n excess of three t ime s before being com-
mitted . Since it i s assumed that many of the juvenile s were on proba -
tion from previous court appearances , t he e xce ss of juvenile court 
appearances prior to their commitment seems to raise a question regard-
ing the success of probation. Can van on this subjects points out : 
Most attempts to measure the success of probation are 
limited to the percentage of children who misbehaved so thor-
oughly during the probation period that they were considered to 
have violated probation or whose behavior was increasingly de-
linquent and necessitated commitment to a correctional school. 
(Cavan , 1962, p. 292) 
Cavan goes on to point out that there are many factors, while a 
juvenile is on probation, which may contribute to future delinquent be-
havior. These factors might be running with a gang, intolerable con-
ditions at home, pressure for conformity, and work experiences, to 
suggest a few. 
Table 2, offenses for which juvemles are committed, revealed 
that "behavioral problems" were the largest category for offenses. This 
appears to ind1cate a certain amount of rebelling against the family or 
conformity while belonging to a delinquent gang. Therefore, a de scrip-
tion of offenses and the number of appearances in court seem to correlate 
with the above statement by Cavan (1962). 
Table 3, parent or parent substitutes present at court hearing, 
showed that in the largest number of cases only a mother figure was 
present at the court hearing. This seems to correlate with Table 16, in 
Appendix, which brought out the fact the largest number of juveniles 
were living with a mother figure only, at the time of commitment. Pre-
vious discussion on the importance of positive family relationships 
would fit into the above mentioned correlation. 
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The 1mportance of a juvenile be ing at his own c ourt hearing , 
Table 4 , is quite obvious ; thus, the writer feels that a d iscussion on 
this point is unnecessary , 
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Tite (1969), a s s tared earlie r, ind ica t ed that summons must be 
served in person to bo th parents o i the j1.:venile . It seems that District I 
1s meetin g thi s requirement , according to the resdt s of 1able 5 , how 
summa s was s erved . Almost 97 per cent o f the summons in this study 
were written and delive"ed in person. 
George (1968b , p . 34) stated "the U . S . Supreme Court felt that 
representation by counsel in juvenile delinquency proceedings is im -
perative ." It would appear from loc i ng at Table 7, representation by 
counsel, that this requiremen of Gault wa s met during the study , Though 
the number of juveniles being represented by counsel was sma ll, there 
had been a waiver of right to coun sel by all parents and juveniles not be-
ing represented by a de ense counselor. 
Again from George (l 968b , p . 33 , " tb.e firs t c o nstitutioo, al mandate 
under the due process c la use is that there be notice of charges g iven to 
the juvenile himself and to his parents. n Tabl e 8 , were parties advised 
on legal rights , indicated that , through the data giv en , half of the Gault 
requirement was being met , that. of notifying parents . Almo st 90 per cent 
of the parents in th i s study were advi sed o the ir rights . Looking ai 
data on the c hild, this right appears to have been reversed . In over 
90 per cent of the cases , it was not recorded whether the child wa s 
notified of his ri ghts . However , taped recordings of the hearings are 
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available and indicate that the child was notified of his rights . 
The Fourteenth Amendment, as pointed out by George (l968b) , con-
tains a portion which reveals that it is important to have the complainant 
present at the proceeding . Table 9 , right to confrontation and cross-
examination , points out that in the largest number of cases , in this study , 
it was not recorded whether the complainant was at the juvenile court 
proceedings . 
George (l968b, p . 35) stated "since the analogy is privilege in the 
adult criminal proceedings , the requirement would appear to be that the 
delinquency acts charged must be proved by means other than question-
ing the juvenile in court." On this subject , Table 11 , privilege against 
self-incrimination in proceedings , revea ls that only in a small number of 
cases (18) were there means used other than just the testimony of the ju-
venile . However, in 15 cases it was not recorded what means were used . 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
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The objectives of this study were as follows : first, to determine 
to what degree the four requirements handed down by the U. S. Supreme 
Court decision on Gault were being met in District I, Utah. The infor-
mation necessary to make the determination was taken from the juvenile 
court records of Distr ict L a nd only from those cases which resulted in 
a commitment to an institution between July 1, 1967, and June 30, 1969. 
These requirements were ~ (a) guarantee to the right of notice given to 
the juvenile himself and to his parents; (b) right to counsel, representa-
tion by counsel in juvenile de linq uency proceedings; (c) right to con-
frontation and cross-examination by prosecuting witnes ses; and 
(d) privilege against self-incrimination in juvenile delinquency pro-
ceedings. 
A second objective of this study was to see if the provisions in the 
1965 Utah Juvenile Court Act, with two changes , would have fulfilled the 
guarantees set down in the U. S . Supreme Court decision on Gault in 
1967. 
A third aim of this study was to become acquainted with the factors 
of age, sex, and race of the juveniles involved in this study. 
A fourth and final aim was to investigate the family background of 
the juvenile at the time of his commitment by looking at his living ar-
rangement, the parent -child or parent subsLitute-ch ld rel atio nship , the 
physical living condit ions of t he JUVenile, h, s paren t 's employment , 
number of siblings, and the natura l parents ' mantal tatus. The la tter 
two a i ms are discussed and summarized in the Appendix . 
The sample o 59 cases wa s taken fro m the juvenile court reco rds 
from Di strict I, Utah , which includes Cache, Box Elder, and Weber 
counti es. This was th e total number of cases resulti ng in commitment 
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to an institution during the period of this study . The data for the sample 
were taken from the legal and social hi story records of each juvenile . 
Before di scussing the above objectives , a review was made of the 
j uvenile c ourt movement in the United States and in the state of Utah . 
Findings 
The record of prev ious c ourt appearances , fo r the juveniles in this 
study , showed that over 60 pe r cent of the juveniles had appeared be-
fore the court in an excess o f three times. One -fourth of the total sample 
had appeared in exces s of s ix times . 
Twice as many juveniles , 35.3 per cent, were committed to an in -
stitution because o f behavioral problems than fo r the next most frequent 
offense, illegal entry . The latter category included 17 . 6 per cent . 
In nearly one-half of the ca s e s, 4 7. 4 per cent, o nly a mother or 
mother-substitute was present at the court hearing . In only one - third 
of the cases, 33 . 9 per cent, were both parents present at the child ' s 
hearing . 
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A written summo ns was dehvered in person to parents in 96 per cent 
of the cases . If the address o f the natural parent was unk own , the sum-
mons was printed m the newspaper four times previous to the coun pro-
ceeding; then a wa1ver wa s s1gned by the probation officer or person 
s earchmg for the parent as to why he had not been lo cated . 
The large s t number of court appearances, 30.6 per cent of the 
total, was between July 1968 and Decembe r 1968 . 
In 89 . 8 per cent o f the c a s es, r.arenrs were advised of their legal 
rights. However, in 91 . 5 per cent o f the cases , no information was re -
corded a s to whether or not rhe child wa s not1fled of his r ight s . It was 
found, through mvestigation by this writer, that the child is advised o f 
hiE righ t s at the beginning of the c ourt proc eeding . This info rmation is 
seldom recorded on the legal transcript but is ava ilable on the tape re-
cording ept of the juvenlle court proceeding. 
Only one - fourth of the juveniles o r his family, 35 . 4 per ce nt , were 
represented by counsel. However, 71.2 per cen t of the amilies and ju-
venile s waived this right. This information was written on the legal 
transcript o the c ourt proceeding . In 23 . 7 per cent of the cases , no 
informat'on was recorded as to whom assumed re sponsibility for appoint-
ment o f c o unsel , the court or t he fam ily. 
In 72. 9 per cent of the cases , no infonnation was recorded as to 
the complainant being present at the court procee ding , 
In 89.8 per cent of the cases , the juvenile admitted the charges 
against him to be true. This fact was recorded on the legal transcript 
of the court proceeding. 
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In 44 per cent of the cases, charges were proved only through di-
rect testimony from the juvenile. In 2 7 per cent of the cases , both the 
testimony from the juvenile and testimony from other persons were used. 
In only 3 per cent of the cases were the charges proved only by means 
other than questioning the juvenile in court. This information was taken 
from the legal record. 
Fifty-seven of the 59 juveniles or 96.6 per cent were committed to 
the Utah State Industrial School. The other two juveniles were committed 
to the Youth Unit of the Utah State Hospital. 
Conc lus ions 
Regarding the first aim of this study, a review of the juvenile court 
record, along with a first-hand inquiry regarding policy and procedures 
gives indication that a major effort was made to meet the four require-
ments of the Gault decision in District I, Utah, between July 1, 1967, 
and Jun e 30, 19 69. However , as mentioned earlier , the record a lone 
gives only partial support to such an impression. Relative to this, the 
following explanations should be noted : it can be readily seen by look-
ing at the record of the juvenile court hearing that notice was given to 
the parent of the juvenile . Concerning the guarantee to the juvenile to 
be notified of his rights , this writer has been reliably informed that 
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each juvenile court hearing is commenced w ith the judge notifying the 
c hild o f his rights , This pro cedure does not , how ever, appear on the 
court pro ceedings reco rd . Consequently, one would listen to the tape 
recording o f eachhearing to be as sured that the ch!ld had, in fac t , bee n 
notified o f hi s r ights. 
It is presently d ifficult to dete rrr, ne , through the juveniie co urt re -
c o rds , whether or no t the th i rd and fourth requirements, right to co niron-
tation and cross-examin atio n by pro secuting w itnesses and priv ilege 
against self-incrimination in juvenile delinquency proceedings, were 
fu lly being met . The court reco rd d1d no t pro v ide o r the name o f the c o m-
pla inant, wh ether or no t the cc mplaina t ' s testimo ny was used to prove 
the charge s against the juvenile , or 1f the c o mplainant wa s cro ss -
e xa mined by the defense (a r ight g uaranteed by the fourth requirement) . 
The second requi rement o f Gault, right to c ounsel , representa tion 
by c ounsel m JUVenile delmquency proceedir.gs, wa s being fully guar-
ante ed juveniles in Di stri.ot I, Although only 2 5 , 4 per cent o f the sample 
was represented by c ounsel, 71. 2 per cent o f the sample waived th is 
right. 
Thu s , the record o f co urt pro ceeding s , when used as the onl y 
source o f informatio n, does no t reflect the full extent to which these 
Gau lt requirements are be ng met in Distric t I, Utah . 
Regarding the seco nd a im of this study , it is further concluded 
from the di s cus sion in Chapter II on the 1965 Utah Juvenile Court Act 
that if o ne sent ence had been added t o t he 1965 Act to reco rd whether 
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or not the juvenile wa s notified of his rights and one sentence added 
to require the complainant to be named and to be present at the proceed-
ing, the four requirement s of Gault would have been completely provided 
for in the 1965 Utah Juvenile Court Act. 
These findings are not represented to be an over-all critic a i 
analysis of the juvenile court system in Utah . 
Suggestions for Further Study 
Further research could be directed toward identifying the feelings 
of family members toward the handling of court procedures. Did they 
feel they had a fair representation? Were they adequately notified of all 
rights? 
Much, in the way of family background, wculd be beneficial in this 
area of juvenile delinquency. A detailed social history of each case 
would give better ideas as to why the juvenile is in his present situation . 
Possibly, new delinquency prevention methods could be suggested. 
A longitudinal study to find the effects of commitment on the be-
havior of the juvenile could be carried out . Sociologists need to know 
more about the effectiveness of present corrective methods. How much 
and what kind of rehabilitation occurs during the period of commitment? 
As of the present date, ihe effects of Gault only are felt in the 
adjudicatory hearing . Further study to see the effects of Gault require -
ments, being carried out in the jurisdictional stage or the first stage 
and into the dispositional or sentencing stage , would be beneficial . 
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Also, Gault is only concerned with delinquency proceedings . Re-
search into the possibilitie s of adding these requirements to the neglect 
and child custody proceedings would be of interesL 
Information needed fo r the presem study was taken only from the 
juvenile court proceedings records . It is a further possibility that ad-
ditional study could be made on the first, third, and fot.:rt h requirements 
of Gault, using the tape recordings of the JUVenile court proceedings 
during this same period to determine to what degree these requirements 
were met on the tape recordings . 
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APPENDIX 
Findings and Discussion on Sex , Race , Age , and 
Family Background of Iuvenile Cases in 
District I , Utah 
The sampk 
Utah has a juvenile court system made up of five districts. The 
sample for this study came from District I wh1ch includes Cache , Box 
Elder, and Weber counties. All juvenile court cases, resulting in com -
mitment between July I, 1967, and June 30 , 1969 , were included in the 
sample . The sample amounted to a total of 59 cases, 19 coming from 
Cache and Box Elder counties and 40 coming from Weber county. 
_!)nd~ 
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Factors of sex, race, and age . The present study shows a much 
higher percentage of boys being involved in delinquent acts. Ma les 
comprised 76.2 per cent or 45 out of the 59 total number of cases. Only 
14 o ut of 59 cases were female , representing 23.8 per cent of the total 
sample (see Table 13 ) . 
Regarding race, the sample was divided into two main groups, 
white and Spanish. The white group included 61 . 0 per cent or 36 cases 
of the tota l population . The Spanish group consisted of 2 7. 1 per cent 
or 16 of the 59 tota l cases . The other 1 1 . 9 per cent included 6 . 8 per 
cent negro or four cases and 3 . 4 per cent or two cases listed as other 
{Swiss) . Only one case did not have race recorded , and t h is was be-
cause the social history of the juvenile was not available (see Table 14). 
Table 13. Sex of juveniles resulting in commitment to an institution, 
July 1, 1967 , to June 30 , 1969 , in District I, Utah 
Sex Number Per cent 
Male 45 76.2 
Female 
Total 59 100 . 0 
Table 14. Race of juveniles in District I, Utah, committed to an in -
stitution 
Race Number Per cent 
White 36 61 . 0 
Negro 4 6.8 
Indian 0 0 . 0 
Spanish 16 27.1 
Oriental 0 . 0 
l . 7 
Not recorded 
Total 59 100 . 0 
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The largest age group of juveniles involved in this study was from 
14-16 years of age . This age group included 71.2 per cent of the entire 
sample or 42 of the 59 cases. The next closest age grouping was the 
17-19 year olds. This age group had 20.3 per cent or 12 cases of the 
population. Four cases or 6. 8 per cent were in the 11-13 age range, 
and only one case or 1. 7 per cent was reported below the age of 10 
(see Table 15). 
Table 15. Age, in years, of juveniles committed to an institution 
Age 
10 or below 
11-13 
14-16 
17-19 
Not recorded 
Total 
Number 
4 
42 
12 
__Q_ 
59 
Per cent 
1.7 
6 . 8 
71.2 
20.3 
__2__:_Q 
100 . 0 
Summary of sex, race, and age. On the summary of the factors 
of sex, race, and age of juveniles committed to an institution in 
District I, Utah, from July I, 1967, to June 30, 1969, it can be seen that 
the largest percentage of the sample was comprised of males , belonging 
to the white racial group, between the ages of 14 and 16. 
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Family background of juveniles . Findings on family background are 
presented in the following pages . Attention is given to living arrange-
ment of the juvenile , parent-child or parent substitute - child relationship , 
parents ' employment , number of siblings, and natural parents' marital 
status . This has been done for a better understanding of the juveniles 
involved in the study. 
As to the juvenile ' s living arrangement , at the time of commitment , 
Table 16 shows that the largest group, 20 cases or 3 3 . 9 per cent of the 
population, were living with their mother or mother substitute only . A 
total of 17 cases or 28 . 8 per cent were living with natura l parents. 
Seven of the 59 juveniles or l l . 8 per cent were living w ith their mother 
and stepfather, while only one juvenile or l . 7 per cent of the study 
was with his father and stepmother . A total of five cases or 8 . 5 per cent 
were with adoptive parents; two cases or 3 , 4 per cent were with th eir 
father or father substitute; two cases or 3 . 4 per cent were in a foster 
home; and three cases or 5. l per cent were living with a re lative . One 
male from Weber county was living by himself after being released from 
the Job Corps in Ogden, Utah. 
This living arran gement , as stated before, was a t the time of the 
juvenile ' s commitment . 
The relationship between the juvenile and his parent or pa ren t 
substitute at the time of commitment can be summarized by referring to 
Table 17. Th ere was a total of 83.0 per cent or 49 of t he 59 cases in 
which the parent - child relationship was "inadequate." The criteria for 
Table 16. Juvenile's living arrangement at the time of commitment 
Arrangement Number Per cent 
Natural parents 17 28 . 8 
Ado pt1 ve parents 5 8.5 
Mo ther an stepfather 11.8 
Father and stepmother 1.7 
Mo ther or mother substitute 
only 20 33 . 9 
father or father substitute 
o nly 3 . 4 
Foster home 3.4 
Relatives 5 . 1 
Othera 1 1.7 
Not recorded 
_l __LZ. 
Total 59 100 . 0 
a 
Self 
Table 17. Parent- child or parent substitute - c hild relationship and 
physical living c onditions at the ti me of commitment 
Relationsh iJ2 Living conditwns 
Situation No. % No . % 
Adequate 6 10.2 23 38 . 9 
Inadequate 49 83.0 9 15 . 3 
Not recorded __..± ~ 27 ~_,_§_ 
Total 59 100 . 0 59 100.0 
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"adequate" parent -child re lationship were set up in Chapter I to include : 
(a) consis tent discipline, (b) understandmg on the part of the parent of 
the juvenile ' s problems , (c) acceptance or the JUvenile by parents , 
(d) desire by parent s to help juvenile, (e) eqLa l attention given to all 
siblings , and (f) acceptance by the Juvenile of standards set by parents. 
lnformation on this matter was obtained from the social history of the ju-
venile which was written by a pro bation officer assigned to work with 
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the juvenile . Both the attitudes of the juvenile and of his parents were 
recorded in the history. Often a probation office r recorded that the 
parents were incor.sistent or did not know how to handle matters of disci-
pline . On the o ther hand , the juvenile , who could not confide in his 
parents , was rebelling against incon sistent or no discipline or simply 
would not live at home. 
Only six of the 59 cases, 10.2 per cent , felt there was an "ade-
qua te" relationship. This relationship was most often reported in the 
cases of )uvemles living wirh relatives or in foster homes. An "inade-
quate" relationship , wh1ch caused a removal from natural parents, 
resulted in juveniles living with relatives or in foster homes . Table 17, 
also, represents information at the time of commitment. 
Living conditions of the juveniles at the time of commitment were 
also reported in Table 17 . The largest group, 27 cases or 45 . 8 per cent, 
did no t record whether the physical living conditions of the home were 
"adequate" or "inadeq uate ." A total of 23 cases or 28.9 per cent of the 
homes were recorded as "adeqt:aie '' wh1le 15.3 per cent or nine cases 
were recorded to be "inadequate , " Th1s mformation was also obtained 
from the soc1al history wntren by the probauo n o ff1cer A large number 
of rhe his tories simply gave the lo catlo n or the d ~mensicn s oi the home; 
t herefore, no statemen t extsted as to whether n was "adequate" or 
"madeqt.:ate . " Criteria for record~ng "adeqeare" or "tnadequare " was 
s et in Chapter I , "Adequate " c o nd itions wo uld include the fo l lowing : 
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(a) adequate sleepir.g and livmg quarters for the num ber of family mem -
bers , (b) clean liness o f house and yard , and (c) other adequate facilities 
such as furniture. "Inadequate" refers to a la ck of the above conditions . 
Concerning parents ' employment , at the time of commitment , 
28 8 per cent o r 17 of the juven iles were living in homes in which 
neither of the parent s o r paren t substitutes were e mployed , This a lone 
might appear to expla i n why housing was inadequate in 15 3 per cent of 
t he cases , These famtlies , without empl o yment , were on welfare . The 
largest percentage of the samp le , 33 . 9 per cer.t or 20 cases, had the 
father o r father s ubstl tc.t e worktng full or part-t~me. In 15 . 2 per cent or 
nine of the cases , bo th parents were working in some capacity, and 
ttve cases or 8 . 5 per cent of the JUveniles had t hei r mother or mother 
substitute s wo rking . Th i s informa tion wa s no t given in cases where t he 
juveniles we re in foster homes or l 1Ving with relaLves . Thus, 13. 6 per 
cent or e i gh t. of the employment situations were not recorded (see 
Table 18) , 
The size o f the famtly , from which the juveniles co me and the ro le 
it plays 1n socia lization , has been aiscussed by many authors . Thus , 
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Table 18. Parents ' employment, neither , part, or full-time, a t the time 
of commitment 
Employmen t Number Per cent 
Father worki ng 20 33.9 
Mother wo rking 8.5 
Bot h working 15.2 
Neither working 17 28.8 
Not recorded 
Total 59 100 . 0 
the number o f si bling s , either natural or brought in through other mar-
riage , was felt to be important to this study. The largest percentage of 
the cases came from familie s of t hre e to five siblings . This group con-
s1sted of 33 .9 per cent or 20 of the j uveniles . Next was the group of 
cases having mo re than five siblings . This percentage was 28 . 8 or 
17 case s . Next was the group of cas e s coming from families of one to 
two siblings . This contained 22 . 0 per cen t or 13 cas es. Only six of the 
59 ca ses d id not have the number of siblings recorded (see Table 19). 
The c h ildhood years are of most importance in the development of 
an mdividua l. The preponderance o f incomplete family settings , as 
illustrated in Ta ble 20 , and marital status of the juvenile ' s natural par-
ents at the time of his commitment may partially explain the juvenile's 
Table 19. Juvenile's number of siblings, natural or through parental 
marriage 
Number 
of 
siblings 
1-2 
3-5 
More 
Not recorded 
Total 
Response 
in 
number 
13 
20 
17 
59 
Per cent 
5 . 1 
22 . 0 
33 . 9 
28 . 8 
100 . 0 
Table 20 . Natural parents ' marital sta tus at the time of commitment 
Status 
Parents living together 
Father deceased 
Mother deceased 
Both parents deceased 
Divorced or separated 
Living together but not married 
Father deserted 
Mother de serted 
Father unknown 
Mother unknown 
Both unknown 
Other a 
Not recorded 
Total 
Number 
17 
8 
3 
3 
19 
0 
4 
0 
59 
a Father deceased but never married. 
Per cent 
28 . 8 
13 . 6 
5.1 
5.1 
32.2 
0 . 0 
6.8 
0.0 
1.7 
1.7 
1.7 
1.7 
___!_;2 
100.0 
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tendency to turn to delinquency. Combining the two categories--parents 
divorced or separated and father deceas ed- -gives an indication of the 
number cf ch1ldren in incomplete family settings . Almost one-third or 
32 . 2 per cent of the natural parents were d ivorced or separated, and 
13 . 6 per cent or e ight of the natural fathers were deceased . This number 
amounted to a total of 45 . 8 per cent of the juveniles coming from homes 
where an oppo;·tunity for ideal parental identification was absent . This 
is compared w ith only 28.8 per cent or 17 of the natural parents living 
together at the time of the juvenile 's commitment. Further, there were 
three cases or 5 .l per cent of the mothers being deceased and three case s 
or 5 . 1 per cent of both parents being deceased. Also included on the 
negative side o f natural parents ' marital status are 6.8 per cent or four of 
the fa t hers having deserted and I . 7 per cent or one case where a mother 
deserted . One case wa s recorded a s having the mother and/or father 
being unknown . And one male child's natural father was deceased but 
had never married the natura l mother . The figures in Tables 17 and 20 
indicate a very discouraging picture of the juvenile's family background . 
Discussion 
Many a uthors , includ i ng Cavan (l962). Gran (1961) , Bandura and 
Walters (1959) , and Gleuck (1 952 , 1962) , have written on the importance 
of family relationships and juvenile delinquency. 
Cavan commented on family background and juveniles committed 
to an institution: 
In general, reports from training schools give little spe-
cific information abou t the families of boys and girl s committed 
to the m . Available information indicates that more trainmg 
school children come from broken homes than is true for de-
linquents m general or for nondelinquent children . Even in the 
smaller training schools with a limited number of children , the 
vanety of bro ken and incomplete homes is very great , each 
suggesting different problems in the child ' s background . 
(Cavan , 1962 , p. 307) 
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Cavan's comment appears to support Table 16 , living arrangements 
of juveniles at the time of commitment , used m the present study . Only 
17 out of the 59 juveniles were in homes with their natu ral parents. This 
was only 28 . 8 per cent of the sample . The other 81.2 per cent of the 
juveniles were in broken homes . 
Table 20 , natural parents ' marital status at the time of commit -
ment , is also supported by Cavan ' s c omment above . Agam , only 17 out 
of the 59 natural parents were living together . This appears to show a 
very low family stability setting . 
Gleuck and Gleuck stated : 
It i s now found that rearing by parents, whose incompati-
bility has been so great that it actually resulted in open breach 
[flesertion, separation , and divorc~ , gave added force to the 
delinquency poten tion o f . . . youngsters . (Glueck and Glueck , 
1969 , p . 122) 
The abo ve statement further back s up the findings report ed in 
Tables 17 and 20 . The foregoing infonmation indicates a seemingly ob-
vious fact; that is, favorable family relationships do no t appear to pro -
duce juvenile delinquency . 
Ban dura and Walters, m regard to parent- child re lationships , 
stated : 
The theory of antisocial aggression that is offered in 
[iheii] book assumes that such a disorder origmates primarily 
from the disruption of a child 's dependency relationship to 
his parents . (Bandura and Walters, 1959 , p . 31) 
This disruption is evident in the number of broken and unnatural 
homes as indicated in Tables 16 and 20 of this study. 
Cavan (1962, p . 30) goes o n to point out "when economic or oc-
cupationa1 background of parents is given , the number receiving public 
assistance or who are employed or working at unskilled labor i s large." 
Again, results from the present study seem to correlate with those 
done by other authors . Table 18 indicates that approximately only one-
third of the fathers involved had some form of employment. In another 
28.8 per cent of the cases , neither parent was working. 
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Glueck and Glueck compared working habits of fathers of delinquent 
and nondelinquent boys c 
Only half as many of the fathers of the delinquent group as 
of the nondelinquent could be characterized as having good work 
habits .. . o At the other e xtreme, five times the proportion of 
the fathers in the delinquent group as in the nondelinquent were 
generally poor workers. . . . 
The extent to which the parents of the delinquents were un -
able to fulfill their family obligations without outside help is 
further reflected in the fact that the average number of social 
welfare agencies that had to step in to serve the families of the 
delinquents in one way or another . . o was a figure almost 
double that of the •• o number of agencies serving the families 
of the nondelinquents. (Glueck and Glueck, 1952, p . 44-45) 
Here again, Glueck and Glueck seem to be in agreement with 
Table 18. The 17 families in Table 18 , in which neither parent figure was 
working, were being helped by public welfare. 
Cavan , in the following statement on family relationships , 
supports the findings in Table 17. This table indicates a high rate of 
"inadequacy" in parent-child relationships . Cavan states ; 
Basically, the family carries a heavy responsibility for 
the character and personality formation of every child . . . . 
Many parents are unable to give their children the love and 
guidance they need; many are unable to introduce their children 
into the cultural mores or help them meet the social expecta-
tions of the larg er community. (Cavan , 1962 , p . 7) 
The defimtion of juvenile delinquency used for this study is sup-
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ported through the above statement. In Chapter I, p. 4-5, it was stated 
that a juvenile delinquent is one whose conduct becomes a menace to 
himself or society . He is a youth who cannot meet expected obligations 
to society. As Cavan pointed out in the above statement, it is the re-
sponsibility of the parent to instruct the child . The present study, as 
mdicated by Tables 16 , 17 , and 20, shows an inadequacy between 
parent and child which would indicate one reason why a juvenile might 
not adjust to society . 
The subject of Table 19 , the number of siblings in the juvenile's 
fami ly , is discussed by Glueck and Glueck (1952, p. 54) who feel it is 
" . . . generally supposed that delinquents stem from larger families 
than do nondelinquents . " The findings in Table 19 are in agreement. 
There was 62.7 per cent of the juveniles who were in families with 
three or more siblings. Of this 62 . 7 percent, 28.8 per cent of the ju-
veniles had six or more siblings . 
According to Cavan (1962 , p . 28) , "boys far outnumber girls in 
court appearances . . . • The ratio is consistently about four boys to 
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one girl , year after year . " Table 13, sex of juveniles resulting in com-
mitment to an institution , July 1 , 19 67, to June 30 , 1969 , in District I , 
Utah , appears to be in accordance with Cavan's figures . During that 
period of time, there were 76 . 2 per cent or 45 males as compared to 
23 . 8 per cent or 14 females . 
Adolescence, age thirteen to early adulthood, is pointed out by 
Cavan (1962 , p . 49) as being a time when the child" .. begins to 
substitute his peer groups for his family as his most important reference 
group." From this group, his standards are set and also his attitudes 
and behaviors are shaped. This period is a time of decisions and un-
certainties for the juvenile . It seems to this writer that, if according to 
our societal standards, the child may become involved with peer groups 
favoring undesirable behavior; the result may be tha t of delinquency. 
Table 14 appears to represent a parallelism with Cavan ' s discussion on 
adol escence; that is, the largest age grouping being committed to an in-
stitution was the group falling into the 14-16 year age bracket. 
It may be seen from the discussion above that rarely is any one 
single factor responsible for the problem of delinquency. Generally 
there is a combination of factors that leads to a juvenile ' s delinquent 
charge (refer to Juvenile Court Referral C ia s sification Code Sheet). 
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SCHEDULE 
Date. ______ _ 
Place of Record __ _ 
(l) ID Number-----
(2) Sex 
1 . male 
2 . female 
3 • not recorded 
(3) Ra ce 
1. white 
2 . negro 
3 . Indian 
4 . Spanish 
5 . orienta 1 
6. other 
7. not recorded 
(4) Age 
1. -10 
2 . 11 - 13 
3. 14-1€ 
4 . 17 --19 
5 . 20-21 
6 . not recorded 
(5) Child ' s living arrangement at the time of commitment 
1. natura l parents 
2 . adoptive parents 
3 . mot her and stepfather 
4 . father and stepmother 
5 . mot her or mother substitute only 
6. father or father substitute only 
7 . foster home 
8. relatives 
9 . other 
10 . not recorded 
(6) Parent - child relationship at the time of commitment taken from social 
history 
1 . inadequate 
2 . adequate 
3. not recorded 
(7) Physical living condit ions at the time of commitment taken from 
social history 
l o adequate 
2 . inadequate 
3 . not recorded 
10 l 
(8) Vocational status (part or ful.ltime) of parents or parent subst it ute 
1 0 father working 
2 . mother working 
3 . both working 
4 0 neither working 
5 . not recorded 
(9) Total number of siblings--full blood or through parental marriage 
l. 0 
2 . l-2 
3 . 3-5 
4 . more 
5 . not recorded 
(lO) Natural parents ' marital status 
1 0 parents living together 
2 . father deceased 
3 . mother deceased 
4 . both parent s deceased 
5 . divorced or separated 
6 . living together but not married 
(ll) 
(12) 
7 . father deserted 
8. mother deserted 
9 . father unknown 
10 . mother unknown 
ll 0 bo th unknown 
Date of trial 
l. 7/67-12/67 
2 . l/68 - 6/68 
3. 7/68-12/68 
4 . l/69- 6/69 
5 . not recorded 
Reason for c ommitment 
l. assault 
2 . car theft 
3 . firearms violation 
4 . illegal entry 
5 . jeo pardy of self (drunkness , etc . ) 
6. mi schief or vandalism 
7. sex o ffenses 
8 . theft 
9 . be haviora l problem s 
10. mi sdemeanor 
11. felony vio la t ions (checks , e tc . ) 
12 . other 
13. not re corded 
(13) Total number of previous appearances in court 
1 . 0-2 
2. 3-5 
3. 6 plus 
4 . not recorded 
(14) Parents present at hearing 
l . father or father subs titute 
2 . mother or mother substitute 
3. both father and mother or both father and mother substitute 
4. neither 
5. not recorded 
(15) Child presen t at hearing 
1 . yes 
2. no 
3 • not recorded 
(1 6) Parents advised of legal rights 
1 . yes 
2. no 
3 • not recorded 
(17) Ch ild notified of rights 
1 . ye s 
2. no 
3 • not recorded 
(18) How summons served 
1 . written 
2 . verbal 
3. de live red written notice 
4 • not recorded 
(19) Represented by counse l 
l . yes 
2 . no 
3 . not recorded 
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(20) Court appointed counsel 
l . yes 
2 . no 
3 . not recorded 
(21) Waived right to counsel by bot h parents and child 
l . yes 
2. no 
3 • not recorded 
(22) Right to confrontation by prosecution witnesses 
l . complainant present at proceeding 
2. complainant not present at proceeding but testimony used in 
case 
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3 . complainant not present at proceeding but testimony not used 
in case 
4. not recorded 
(2 3) Privilege again s t self- incrimination in proceeding 
1 . charges proved by means other than questioning juvenile in 
court 
2. c harges proved by direct testimony from juvenile 
3. both of the above 
4 . not recorded 
(24) Child adm itted allegations to be true 
1 . yes 
2. no 
3 • not recorded 
(2 5) Where committed 
1 . Utah State Indus trial School 
2 . Youth Unit, Utah State Hospital 
3. other 
4 . not recorded 
Comment: 
JUVENILE COURT .REFERRAL CLASSIFICATION CODE SHEET 
VIOLATIONS OF LAW 
ASSAULTS 
OOJ Assault 
002 Assault & Battery 
003 Assault with Deadly 
Weapon 
009 Other (speci y) 
AUTOMOBILE CASES 
010 Auto Theft 
0 lJ. Depriving Owner of 
Vehicle 
012 Illegal Entry of Vehicle 
for Theft (Car Prowl) 
013 Tampering with Vehicle 
(Car Strip) 
014 Gas Theft 
019 Other (specify) 
riRE, FIREARMS, FIRE ALARMS, 
FIREWORKS 
020 Arson 
0 21 Fire Setting 
022 Unlawful Use of Firearms 
023 False Alarms 
024 Fireworks 
029 Other (specify} 
ILLEGAL ENTRY 
0 30 Burglary 
0 31 Unlawful Entry to Injure, 
Damage, o r Annoy 
JEOPARDY OF SELF 
040 Public Intoxication 
041 Posses sian of Alcohol 
042 Minor in Tavern 
043 Possession of Tobacco 
044 Wrongfully Inhaling Fu mes 
045 Attempted Suicide 
046 Use of Narcotics , Amphet-
amines, Barbiturates, etc. 
049 Other (specify) 
MISCHIEF OR VANDALISM 
0 50 Destruction of Propen:y 
0 51 F 'ghting 
0 52 Disturbing the Peace 
0 53 Riot 
054 Trespass 
0 55 Throwing Objects at Vehicle 
059 Other (specify} 
SEX OFFENSES 
060 Rape 
0 61 Illicit Sex Acts 
0 62 Unnatural Sex Acts 
063 Molest 
064 Indecent Acts 
0 69 Other (specify) 
THEFT 
070 Grand Larceny 
0 71 Petit Larceny 
0 72 Bicycle Th eft 
0 73 Shoplifting 
074 Receiving Stolen Property 
OTHER VIOLATIONS OF LAW 
FELONY TYPE 
080 Ro bbery 
081 Bad Checks and Fraud 
082 Homicide 
083 Negligent Homicide 
089 Other Felony Type 
M~SD:CMEANOR TYPE 
090 Cruelty to Animals 
091 Curfew 
092 Tampering with Railroads 
093 Re sisting Arrest 
094 Refusing to Di sperse 
095 Fi sh &, Game Violation 
096 Boating Violation 
099 Other (specify) 
097 Foul and Abusive Language 
098 G iving False Information 
104 
BEHAVIORAL PROBLEMS 
100 Out of Control (Ungov . ) 
101 Runaway 
102 Runaway-Transient 
103 Habitual Truancy 
104 Truancy 
10 5 Truant in Auto 
106 Contempt of Court 
109 Other Behav io r or Condition 
Endangering to Welfare 
(specify) 
NEGLECTED OR DEPENDENT 
l SO Abandoned 
151 Mistreatment or Abuse 
l 52 Improper Care Due to 
Faults or Habits 
l 53 Improper Care-- Failure to 
Provide Subsistence , 
Education, Medical Care or 
Other Care 
l 54 Dependent 
155 Permanent Termination of 
Parental Rights 
OTHER JURISDICTION - -JUVENILE 
2 50 Consent for Marriage 
2 51 Consent for Employment 
2 52 Consent for Enlistment 
2 53 Expungement of Record 
2 54 Determination of Custody 
on Transfer from District 
Court 
2 55 Change of Custody 
257 Request fo r Renewal of 
Custody 
2 58 Request Termination 
2 60 Re v iew Hearing 
2 61 Probation Officer Progress 
Report 
ADMINISTRATIVE 
300 Supervision under Interstate 
Compact 
30 l Supervisio n - -Other District 
302 Supervision of Parolee 
303 Investigation for other Agency 
304 Courtesy Supervision 
309 Other Administrative Case 
10 5 
ADULT CASES 
350 Contributing to Delinquency 
of a Mmor 
351 Contributing to Neglect of 
o f Child 
3 52 W1lful Abuse , Neglect or 
Abandcnment 
3 53 Contempt of Court--Adult 
359 Other (specify) 
REFERRAL SOURCE 
l. Law Enforcement Agency 
A . County Sheriff 
B. City Police 
c . Highway Patrol 
D. Fish & Game 
E . Federal Law Officer 
F . Other State Law Officer 
G . Court Probation Officer 
H . Other Law Enforcement 
2. School 
3 . Family or Relatives 
4. Public Welfare 
5. Private Welfare 
6. Juvenile Court 
7 . District Court 
8 . Self 
9 . Other 
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Form 12 
IN THE DISTRIC T JUVENILE COURT FOR COUN1Y, 
STATE OF UTAH 
MI NUTES 
Case No . 
Name Age (Birthdate) Residence 
Date of Hearing, _____ _ Probation Officer ____ _ 
Persons Present : Father Yes No Mother Yes No 
Child Yes No 
Father, Mother, Child. _____ represented by counsel Yes No 
Name of Counsel. __________________________ _ 
Parties advised of legal rights ; Yes 
Waived right to Counsel Yes No 
to be true: Yes No 
ORDER: 
Date to come back before Court: 
No 
Child ____ admits allegations 
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Form 23 
IN THE DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT 
FOR. _________ COUN1Y, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
A person under eighteen years of age 
PROBATION ORDER 
AND AGREEMENT 
Case No. ___ _ 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that you be placed on probation under the super-
vision of the Probation Department of this Court under the following 
conditions: 
l. That you do not commit further acts of delinquency; 
2. That you attend school regularly until you are 18 years of age 
or graduate from senior high school or be released from at-
tendance by the Board of Education; 
3 . That you comply with all lawful and reasonable requests of 
your parents or custodian with whom you are living; 
4. That you notify the Probation Department of any change of 
your address , change of school or change of employment; 
5. That you do not get married without the consent of your par-
ent and the above court; 
6. That you do not leave the state without the consent of your 
probation officer; 
7. That you do not purchase an automobile without the consent 
of your parents and probation off icer; 
8 . That you pay restitution in the sum of $ __ ; fine in the sum 
of $ ___ to be paid on or before the __ day of ___ , 19 __ ; 
Dated this ___ day of. ____ , 19 __ 
Judge 
AGREEMENT 
I HEREBY AGREE to conform to and obey the terms of my probation as 
stated above and as outlined by my Probation Officer; I FURTHER AGREE 
to report to my Probation Officer as directed. 
Child 
Parent 
Probation Officer Parent 
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Rev . Form 
TN THE DISTRICT J UVENILE COURT 
FORc___ ________ COUNTY , STATE OF UTAH 
STATE Or UTAH, in the interest of 
ORDER EXPUNGING RECORD 
Case No·--------
A person _________ years of age 
The Petition for Expungement of Record having come from this Court 
on the ____ _:day of-------' 19 ___ the Petitioner and 
being present, the court having heard and examined all the 
evidence adduced at the hearing finds that the Petitioner 
1 . Has been terminated fro m continuing juvenile court jurisdiction 
or has been uncondit ionally released from the State Industrial 
School for more than one year; 
2 . Has not been convicted o t a felony or a misdemeanor involving 
moral turpitude since such termination of juvenile juris diction 
nor are there proceedings involving such felony or misdemeanor 
pending or being instituted against the Petitioner; 
3 . Has been rehabili tated to the s atisfaction of the Court . 
It is therefore ORDERED that all the records in Petitioner's case in 
the custody of this Court and the records of 
be sealed ; except traffic matters . 
That the Petitioner ' s case shall be deemed never to have occurred 
and the Petitioner may properly reply accordingly upon any inquiry in the 
matter. Dated this ____ .day of ------,---:--- ---
BY THE COURT 
19 __ 
Judge 
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